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FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE 413, 414, AND 415: FIFTEEN
YEARS OF HINDSIGHT AND WHERE THE LAW SHOULD GO
FROM HERE
Bryan C. Hathorn'
Courts that follow the common-law tradition
have almost unanimously come to disallow .
. . evidence of a defendant's evil character
to establish a probability of his guilt.
The inquiry is not rejected because
character is irrelevant; on the contrary, it is
said to weigh too much with the jury and so
overpersuade them as to prejudge one with
a bad general record . . .
Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469, 475-76 (1948).
In our system of jurisprudence, we try cases, rather than
persons.
People v. Allen, 420 N.W.2d 499, 504 (Mich. 1988).
In 1995, Congress added three rules, which
governed the admissibility of "prior sexual misconduct" in
federal trials, to the Federal Rules of Evidence.2  The
procedure by which Congress added the rules was outside
of the normal procedure for the creation of federal rules, it
was highly controversial, and it was done over the
Haverford College, B.A. 1991, California Institute of Technology,
Ph.D. 1999, University of Tennessee, J.D. 2010. Presently a judicial
clerk for the Tennessee Supreme Court. The author thanks Prof.
Maurice Stucke for his helpful comments. Any opinions and any errors
are the responsibility of the author.
2 See FED. R. EvID. 413,414, 415.
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objections of the judicial conference. 3  The controversy
surrounding the rules produced a flurry of scholarship on
the rules, which continued for about five years. After this
initial period, the storm quieted with a reduced amount of
scholarship on the subject. It is now fifteen years since the
new rules went into effect and it is possible to look back at
the effect of the rules with perspective and examine the
impact they had on trends and changes in the law of
evidence in the United States.
Section I discusses the history of the Federal Rules
of Evidence and the admission of "other acts" character
evidence under the rules. Section II highlights the
development of law forbidding character evidence and the
limited exceptions to the rule. Section III discusses the
rationalizations behind the character evidence rules and the
rationalization for Rules 413, 414, and 415. Section IV
discusses recidivism of sexual offenders that underlies
many of the rationalizations for the rules. Section V
outlines the impact of Rules 413, 414, and 415 on evidence
law. Section VI concludes with a discussion of what
should be done with character evidence rules for sexual
offenders in the future.
I. "Other Acts" Character Evidence under the Federal
Rules of Evidence
The Federal Rules of Evidence govern the
admissibility of evidence in federal courts. In 1965 Chief
Justice Earl Warren formed an advisory committee to draft
the rules, which were intended as a codification of the
3 See Act of Jan. 2, 1975, Pub. L. No. 93-595, 88 Stat. 1926 (1975).
See also Report of the Judicial Conference on the Admission of
Character Evidence in Certain Sexual Misconduct Cases, 159 F.R.D.
51 (1995) [hereinafter Report of the Judicial Conference].
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common law tradition of evidence.4 The codification of the
Rules of Evidence originally took place pursuant to the
Rules Enabling Act, and ultimately the rules were passed
by Congress and signed by the President as the Act to
Establish Rules of Evidence for Certain Courts and
Proceedings.
5
At the most fundamental level, the Federal Rules of
Evidence assume that judges and juries act rationally. For
instance, Rule 105 permits a judge to ask a jury to limit its
consideration of evidence for a particular purpose.6 That
juries can segregate evidence into discrete packages and
apply the evidence for limited purposes assumes that juries
behave rationally. That assumption has been criticized as
unrealistic.7
4See Glen Wissenberger, The Proper Interpretation of the Federal
Rules of Evidence: Insights from Article VI, 30 CARDOZO L. REv. 1615
(2009).
5 Act of Jan. 2, 1975, Pub. L. No. 93-595, 88 Stat. 1926 (1975).
6 "When evidence which is admissible as to one party or for one
purpose but not admissible as to another party or for another purpose is
admitted, the court, upon request, shall restrict the evidence to its
proper scope and instruct the jury accordingly." FED. R. EVID. 105.
7 Courts recognize that limiting instructions do not cure the impact of
prejudicial evidence. See, e.g., Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U.S.
440, 453 (1949) (Jackson, J., concurring) (calling the idea that
prejudicial effects can be overcome by a jury instruction "unmitigated
fiction"); Nash v. United States, 54 F.2d 1006, 1007 (2d Cir. 1932)
(describing limiting instructions as "a mental gymnastic which is
beyond, not only [the jury's] power, but anybody else's."). See also
Joel D. Lieberman & Jamie Arndt, Understanding the Limits of
Limiting Instructions, 6 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 677 (2000).
Interestingly, it may be that judges are able to go through the mental
gymnastic of excluding inadmissible evidence in bench trials better
than has been supposed. The conviction rate in federal bench trials-
where the judges have seen inadmissible evidence-is lower than that
in federal jury trials. Daniel Givelber, Lost Innocence: Speculation
and Data about the Acquitted, 42 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1167, 1185-86
(2005). However, some of this effect is probably due to self selection
by defendants with a weak case trying to roll the dice with the jury. Id.
3
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At the same time, however, the Federal Rules of
Evidence recognize that sometimes evidence, while
relevant, 8 is so prejudicial that a jury cannot be exposed to
it, even with a limiting instruction. 9 The commentary
surrounding Rule 403-which excludes evidence where the
"probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger
of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading
the jury"' -suggests that "[ulnfair prejudice within [this]
context means an undue tendency to suggest decision on an
improper basis, commonly, though not necessarily, an
emotional one.""l  As such, the Rules of Evidence
recognize that jurors, who are presumed to be rational,
suffer from inherent, non-rational tendencies.12 The Rules
of Evidence explicitly recognize that the presumption that
jurors are rational must be balanced against their irrational
decision making, and the rules provide for this balance
through the "balancing test" of Federal Rule of Evidence
403. This balance provides a fundamental protection to the
8 The basis of the Federal Rules of Evidence is that only relevant
evidence should be admitted. See FED. R. EVID. 401 ("Relevant
evidence means evidence having any tendency to make the existence of
any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more
probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence"); FED.
R. EVID. 402 ("All relevant evidence is admissible, except as otherwise
provided. . . by these rules . . . ").
9 "Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice ... "
FED. R. EvID. 403 (emphasis added).
10 FED. R. EVID. 403. In addition to protecting against non-rational jury
decisions, Rule 403 is also intended to protect against inefficiencies of
trial by excluding evidence which will cause "undue delay, waste of
time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence." Id.
" FED. R. EVID. 403 advisory committee's note.
12 It is well known that jurors are subject to make decisions based on
emotion. See, e.g., Todd E. Pettys, The Emotional Juror, 76 FORDHAM
L. REv. 1609 (2000). The American Bar Association entreats
prosecutors not to "use arguments calculated to inflame the passions..
of the jury." ABA Project on Standards for Criminal Justice,
Standards Relating to the Administration of Criminal Justice 98 (1974).
4
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defendant, limiting admission of evidence likely to be
misused by the jury.
The fundamental protections of Rule 403 are found
again in Rule 404, which regulates the admissibility of
"character evidence." 13 The Rules of Evidence recognize
that evidence of "other crimes, wrongs, or acts" is perhaps
the most prejudicial evidence that could be admitted at
trial 14 and explicitly excludes it from consideration by the
jury: "[e]vidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not
admissible to prove the character of a person in order to
show action in conformity therewith."' 15 The basis for this
rule is not to exclude evidence that is irrelevant; it is to
exclude relevant evidence that is likely to be misused by
13 Federal Rule of Evidence 404(a) states the general rule that
"[e]vidence of a person's character or a trait of character is not
admissible for the purpose of proving action in conformity therewith on
a particular occasion. . . ." Character evidence comes in many forms,
but the focus in this article is on "other acts" character evidence. This
type of evidence is known by many names, including "preponderance
evidence" or "prior bad acts" evidence.
14 The caution against use of other acts character evidence is not only
for criminal cases discussed in the present article. The Advisory
Committee cautioned against the use of such character evidence in civil
cases, stating:
[c]haracter evidence is of slight probative value and
may be very prejudicial. It tends to distract the trier
of fact from the main question of what actually
happened on the particular occasion. It subtly
permits the trier of fact to reward the good man and
to punish the bad man because of their respective
characters, despite what the evidence in the case
shows actually happened.
FED. R. EvID. 404 advisory committee's note (citing Cal. Law.
Revision Comm'n, Rep. Rec. & Studies, 657-58 (1964)) (emphasis
added).
15 FED. R. EVID. 404(b).
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the jury.' 6 However, there are exceptions that allow the
evidence to be admitted for the limited purpose 17 of
showing "proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation,
plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or
accident."' 8  Even when such character evidence is
admitted for a limited purpose, the rule does not require
that it be admitted; admission is still subject to the
safeguard of Rule 403, preventing admission of unfairly
prejudicial evidence. 19 The safeguard against prejudicial
use of "other acts" evidence follows the tradition in
American courts that "a defendant must be tried for what he
did, not who he is."
20
In 1994, the landscape for character evidence in
federal court changed. The United States Congress-over
16 Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469 (1948). Justice Jackson
summarized the reason for excluding character law evidence in his
opinion:
Courts that follow the common-law tradition have
almost unanimously come to disallow. . . evidence
of a defendant's evil character to establish a
probability of his guilt. . . . The inquiry is not
rejected because character is irrelevant; on the
contrary, it is said to weigh too much with the jury
and so overpersuade them as to prejudge one with a
bad general record and deny him a fair opportunity.
The overriding policy of excluding such
evidence, despite its admitted probative value, is the
practical experience that its disallowance tends to
prevent confusion of issues, unfair surprise and
undue prejudice.
Id. at 475-76 (citations and footnote omitted).
17 See FED. R. EVID. 105.
18 See FED. R. EVID. 404(b). Character evidence may also be admitted
if it is an "essential element" of the action.
19 See FED. R. EVID. 404 advisory committee's note on 2000
amendments.
20 United States v. Foskey, 636 F.2d 517, 523 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (quoting
United States v. Meyers, 550 F.2d 1036, 1044 (5th Cir. 1977)).
6
7:1 Tennessee Journal of Law and Policy 28
the objections of the Judicial Conference 2 1-- enacted
22
Federal Rules of Evidence 413, 414, and 415. Federal
21 The Judicial Conference noted that the rules were opposed by "the
overwhelming majority of judges, lawyers, law professors, and legal
organizations." Report of the Judicial Conference, supra note 3, at 52.
That an "overwhelming majority" of legal scholars objected to the rules
is probably an understatement. When the Judicial Conference
Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure voted, there was a
single vote in favor of the rules-from the representative of the
Department of Justice. Id. This result was not surprising, as the senior
counsel of the Department of Justice, David Karp, authored the rules.
See 140 CoNG. REC. H8991-92 (daily ed. Aug. 21, 1994) [hereinafter,
Floor Statement of Rep. Molinari] (statement of Rep. Molinari). A
minority of commentators have suggested that the change in the rules
was positive. See, e.g., Mary Katherine Danna, Note, The New Federal
Rules of Evidence 413-415: The Prejudice of Politics or Just Plain
Common Sense?, 41 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 277, 309 (1996) (arguing that
character evidence of prior bad acts is relevant and that the rules don't
go far enough in relaxing the restrictions on its use).
22 Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L.
No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 1796 (1994). The procedure by which the rules
were put into place was different than the rest of the Federal Rules of
Evidence, which were developed with the advice of the Judicial
Conference. In the case of Rules 413, 414, and 415, the rules were
forcibly added by a political process. The procedure by which they
were added is in section 320935 of Public Law 103-322:
(b) Implementation. The amendments [enacting the
rules] shall become effective pursuant to subsection
(d).
(c) Recommendations by Judicial Conference. Not later
than 150 days after the date of enactment of this Act,
the Judicial Conference of the United States shall
transmit to Congress a report containing
recommendations for amending the Federal Rules of
Evidence as they affect the admission of evidence of
a defendant's prior sexual assault or child molestation
crimes in cases involving sexual assault and child
molestation. The Rules Enabling Act shall not apply
to the recommendations made by the Judicial
Conference pursuant to this section.
(d) Congressional Action
7
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Rules of Evidence 413, 414, and 415 explicitly make
evidence of prior sexual offenses admissible in both civil
and criminal trials.23 Essentially, the change in the rules
(1) It the recommendations described in subsection
(c) are the same as the amendment made by
subsection (a) [enacting the rules], then the
amendments made by subsection (a) shall
become effective 30 days after the transmittal of
the recommendations.
(2) If the recommendations described in subsection
(c) are different than the amendments made in
subsection (a), the amendments made by
subsection (a) shall become effective 150 days
after the transmittal of the recommendations...
Id. Thus, the change to the rules took place over any thoughtful
objections of the Judicial Conference, which submitted a report to
Congress objecting to from the proposed rules.
23 The text of the Federal Rules of Evidence follows, in pertinent part:
Rule 413. Evidence of Similar Crimes in Sexual
Assault Cases
(a) In a criminal case in which the defendant is accused
of an offense of sexual assault, evidence of the
defendant's commission of another offense or
offenses of sexual assault is admissible, and may be
considered for its bearing on any matter to which it is
relevant. ...
Rule 414. Evidence of Similar Crimes in Child
Molestation Cases
(a) In a criminal case in which the defendant is accused
of an offense of child molestation, evidence of the
defendant's commission of another offense or
offenses of child molestation is admissible, and may
be considered for its bearing on any matter which it is
relevant. . ..
Rule 415. Evidence of Similar Acts in Civil Cases
Concerning Sexual Assault or Child Molestation
(a) In a civil case in which a claim for damages or other
relief is predicated on a party's alleged commission
of conduct constituting an offense of sexual assault or
child molestation, evidence of that party's
8
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"supersede[s] in sex offense cases the restrictive aspects of
,24Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b)." In one action,
Congress overruled the fundamental protections for the
accused, which had been developed through centuries of
case law and codified into the Federal Rules of Evidence.
The "new rules, which [were] not supported by empirical
evidence, could diminish . . . protections that have
safeguarded persons accused in criminal cases and parties
in civil cases."
25
The addition of Federal Rules of Evidence 413, 414,
and 415 added complexity to the usual scheme for
admission of "other acts" character evidence. Ordinarily,
under Rule 404, evidence of other wrongs to prove
conformity therewith is excluded.26 There are a number of
limited exceptions where the evidence may be admitted to
prove some other issue, 27 but even under one of these
limited exceptions, the admissibility was subject to the
protections of Rule 403. The Judicial Conference
suggested that if Congress insisted on the new rules, in
order to protect the accused and maintain the balance of the
Federal Rules of Evidence, an explicit reference to Rule
403 should be added.28 Ultimately Congress declined to
modify the new rules before they went into effect.
Federal Rules of Evidence 413, 414, and 415
reverse the normal procedure. Under these rules, evidence
of another act "is admissible, and may be considered for its
commission of another offense or offenses of sexual
assault or child molestation is admissible and may be
considered as provided in Rule 413 and Rule 414 of
these Rules. ...
24 Floor Statement of Rep. Molinari, supra note 21.
25 Report of the Judicial Conference, supra note 3, at 53.
26 FED. R. EVID. 404(b).
27 See FED. R. EVID. 404(b).
28 Report of the Judicial Conference, supra note 3, at 54.
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bearing on any matter to which it is relevant." 29 The floor
debate and the comments from the author of the rule
30
indicated that the rule was intended to be subject to the
overall protections of the balancing test of Rule 403;
however, the actual language of the rule is unambiguous-
"evidence . . . is admissible.' The usual method of
statutory construction32 is to investigate the legislative
intent only when the language of the statute is ambiguous.
In this case, however, the plain meaning of the statute
allows broad admissibility. Despite the lack of ambiguity,
courts have generally applied the protections of Rule 403 to
consideration of evidence under Rules 413, 415, and 415.33
A second issue with the application of the rules is
the standard of proof necessary for the admission of
evidence of "other acts." The rules only refer to
"commission" of the other act,34 and contain no statement
as to the burden of proof or the reliability of the evidence.
They do not specify whether the evidence of the other act
requires that the defendant was convicted for the prior
offense, that the defendant was charged for the crime, or
29 This language appears in section (a) of each of the three rules. FED.
R. EVID. 413, 414, 415.
30 See David J. Karp, Evidence of Propensity and Probability in Sex
Offense Cases and Other Cases, 70 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 15 (1994).
31 FED. R. EVID. 413 (emphasis added). See also FED. R. EvID. 414,
415. Given the comments of the author of the rules, this may be a
drafting error. See Karp, supra note 30. The rules appear to be poorly
drafted in other ways. The drafting errors in the statute could probably
be revised, but given the difficulty in passing the law, and the almost
unanimous objection to the rules by scholars and jurists, it is unlikely
that Congress will revisit the debate.
32 Rules of evidence are constructed in the same manner as any other
statute. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., 509 U.S. 579, 587 (1993).
33 See, e.g., Erik D. Ojala, Note, Propensity Evidence under Rule 413.
The Need for Balance, 77 WASH. U. L.Q. 947, 968 (1999) (reviewing
Eighth and Tenth Circuit cases).
34 "[Elvidence of the defendant's commission of another offense" of
sexual misconduct is all that is required under the rules. FED. R. EVID.
413.
10
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that there was merely an allegation against the defendant.
Presumably a juror who hears evidence based on a mere
allegation of prior misconduct would discount the charge,
but given the inflammatory nature of the evidence, a mere
allegation could be extremely prejudicial.
A third issue is with the "similar" nature of the
crimes. The title of each of the rules refers to "evidence of
similar crimes," but nowhere in the body of the rule is the
evidence restricted to "similar" crimes.3 5 Under a literal
reading of the rules, a sexual assault against a male child
would be admissible as evidence in a case of a sexual
assault against an adult female, despite the fact that the
crimes are not "similar." 36  While such a case may be
extreme, it demonstrates the all encompassing language of
the rules.
Finally is the issue of the relevance of other acts
that occurred far in the past. The usual application of the
rules sugests that offenses that are decades old are not
relevant. Rules 413, 414, and 415 provide that the
evidence is admissible with no limitations on time.
38
Admission of evidence of a prior bad act which is decades
old may be of limited relevance, but would still be highly
inflammatory .39
35 This may be another drafting error, but as described supra note 31, it
is unlikely that after the controversy when the rules were enacted
Congress will want to revisit the issue.36 See FED. R. EVID. 413(d) (defining "sexual assault").
31 See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 609 (indicating that a criminal conviction
over ten years old is not relevant for the issue of impeachment of
witnesses).
38 FED. R. EvID. 413,414,415.
39 In Department of Justice statistics, 5.4 percent of sexual offenders
released in 1994 were rearrested for another sexual crime within three
years after their release. However, of this number, 40 percent were
rearrested within the first year. PATRICK A. LANGAN ET AL.,
RECIDIVISM OF SEX OFFENDERS RELEASED FROM PRISON IN 1994 (Nov.
2003), available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/
11
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II. The Prohibition of Trial by Character
a. Common Law History
Since the inception of the American judicial system,
courts have generally prohibited the use of character
evidence as evidence that a person's other acts conform to
an alleged crime. 40 The origins of the rule certainly trace
back to English law, where the earliest cases are mixed.4'
The most famous case citing the proposition may be People
v. Molineux, 61 N.E. 286 (1901), which cites numerous
cases dating to the middle of the nineteenth century for the
proposition that character evidence to "show action in
conformity therewith," should be excluded.42 Molineux
famously states the rule and gives the basis for it:
The general rule of evidence applicable to
criminal trials is that the state cannot prove
against a defendant any crime not alleged in
the indictment, either as a foundation for a
separate punishment, or as aiding the proofs
pdf/rsorp94.pdf. This indicates that it is likely that the older the offense
is-or at least the longer since the offender was released from prison
and has had the opportunity to reoffend-the less relevant the evidence
of a prior sexual offense is. This corresponds to the recognition that
"stale" convictions are of little probative value in matters such as the
truthfulness of a witness. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 609(b).
40 David P. Leonard, In Defense of the Character Evidence Prohibition:
Foundations of the Rule Against Trial by Character, 73 IND. L.J. 1161,
1162 (1998) [hereinafter Foundations].
4 Leonard cites the case of Duke of Norfolk v. Germaine, 12 How. St.
Tr. 927 (K.B. 1692) for the proposition that evidence of prior bad acts
was admissible, at least in a case for adultery. Foundations, supra note
40 at 1168. However, Leonard cites Rex v. Cole, Mich. Term (1810),
an unpublished case, for the proposition that, by 1810, the rule
excluding character evidence was firmly in place in American
jurisprudence. Id. at 1170.
42 FED. R. EVID. 404(b).
12
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that he is guilty of the crime charged. This
rule, so universally recognized and so firmly
established in all English-speaking lands, is
rooted in that jealous regard for the liberty
of the individual which has distinguished
our jurisprudence from all others, at least
from the birth of Magna Charta. It is the
product of that same humane and
enlightened public spirit which, speaking
through our common law, has decreed that
every person charged with the commission
of a crime shall be protected by the
presumption of innocence until he has been
proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.
43
The general common law prohibition against character
evidence is now firmly seated in American jurisprudence. 4
The prohibition is limited in scope, however, in that
the evidence is permitted to the extent that it is offered to
prove that a person has a trait that would make it more
likely that he or she would commit the act in question.
45
Even though "other acts" character evidence is generally
excluded, the Molineux court recognized the existence of a
narrower list of exceptions than the list found in the present
43 People v. Molineux, 61 N.E. 286,293-94 (1901) (citations omitted).
44 See generally 1 GEORGE E. Dix et al., MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE §
186 (6th ed. 2006).
45 Foundations, supra note 40, at 1165-66. Other acts evidence is
admissible for legitimate non-character purposes, such as "proof of
motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or
absence of mistake or accident." FED. R. EvID. 404(b). Evidence is
generally admissible when it has a bearing on the truthfulness of the
accused as a witness, or where the prior act is an essential element of
the charge. An example of the latter, relevant to the present discussion
of sex crimes, is found in Utah Code Ann. § 76-5404.1(3)(g) (making
prior offenses an element of aggravated sexual abuse of a child as an
enhancement factor).
13
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Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b).46 However, by the time
the Federal Rules of Evidence were enacted, the rule of
excluding "other acts" evidence to prove "action in
conformity therewith"47 was the law in almost every
jurisdiction.48
As previously noted, the common law did provide
exceptions. One of those exceptions was the "lustful
disposition" doctrine, which allowed admission of prior
46 Molineux, 61 N.E. at 294. ("This rule, and the reasons upon which it
rests, are so familiar to every student of our law that they need be
referred to for no other purpose than to point out the exceptions
thereto.") A curiosity in the Molineux case is that the evidence which
was excluded there of the commission of a prior murder would likely
be admissible under modem rules of evidence. The method of the
murder in Molineux was to mail a bottle of mercuric cyanide disguised
as medicine to the victim. Id. It is arguable that the distinctive method
of the crime is evidence of "preparation, plan, knowledge, [and]
identity," which could render it admissible under an exception to the
character evidence exclusion. FED. R. EVID. 404(b). However, those
exceptions to the rule did not exist at the time of the Molineux court,
which only recognized exceptions for motive, intent, absence of
mistake or accident, or a common plan or scheme. See Molineux, 61
N.E. at 294-300.
47 FED. R. EVID. 404(b).
48 Preliminary Draft of the Proposed Rules of Evidence, 46 F.R.D. 161,
229 (1969) ("In most jurisdictions today, the circumstantial use of
character is rejected.") In the middle part of the twentieth century,
there was a movement toward uniform laws. In the Preliminary Draft
of the Proposed Rules of Evidence:
[t]he Committee acknowledge[d] its indebtedness to
its predecessors in the field of drafting rules of
evidence. The American Law Institute Model Code
of Evidence, Uniform Rules of Evidence, New Jersey
Rules of Evidence, and California Evidence Code,
with their supporting studies and commentaries, were
invaluable in suggesting general approaches and
organization as well as particular solutions.
Id. at 190.
14
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criminal acts of sexual offenders. 49 The lustful disposition
doctrine is still recognized in a number of states to admit
prior sexual misconduct evidence. 50 The doctrine is similar
to the motive, identity, intent, or absence of mistake or
accident exceptions to the rule against admissibility of
character evidence. 51 A "lustful disposition" is certainly
relevant to intent and motive to commit a sexual offense.
The means by which the prior offense was committed, if
the modus operendi is sufficiently similar to the presently
accused offense, is certainly probative to identity of the
offender. For example, if a defendant charged with
statutory rape contends that the victim "looked like an
adult," prior charges on the same offense would certainly
be relevant to the absence of mistake.52 Since "other acts"
evidence could be admitted under these ordinary exceptions
in Rule 404(b), there is no need for a special "lustful
disposition" rule admitting prior sexual misconduct.
49 See Jeffrey Waller, Comment, Federal Rules of Evidence 413-415:
"Laws are like Medicine; They Generally Cure an Evil by a Lesser..
* Evil", 30 TEX. TECH L. REV. 1503, 1527-30 (1999) (reviewing the
lustful disposition doctrine).
50 See, e.g., Danna, supra note 21, at 283-84 (describing the "lustful
disposition" doctrine and collecting cases). But see Kenneth J. Melilli,
The Character Evidence Rule Revisited, 1998 BYU L. REv. 1547, 1584
(arguing that in states that have adopted "rules of evidence patterned
after Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b), the 'lustful disposition'
exception has arguably been abandoned").
51 Evidence "may. . . be admissible for other purposes, such as proof
of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity,
or absence of mistake or accident. . . . " FED. R. EVID. 404(b).
52 A critical difference is that the evidence which would be admitted
against the defendant who raises the "mistake" defense is that the
evidence would be admitted to rebut a defense that the defendant put at
issue. If the defendant opens the door by raising the defense, in
fairness the prosecution should be allowed to rebut it. Thus, the
defendant would have an opportunity to exclude the evidence by not
taking the stand. The issue here is that the defendant, in effect, chooses
to admit the evidence by raising the mistake defense.
15
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b. Reasons for the Prohibition
The Molineux court stated the philosophical reasons
behind forbidding character evidence in terms of the
jurisprudence of a presumption of innocence. However,
there are several other grounds, both legal and practical,
which suggest that character evidence should be excluded.
1. Legal Rationales
a) Due Process
Courts have found in the past that admission of
character evidence violates the Due Process rights of the
accused.53 In considering Federal Rules of Evidence 413,
414, and 415, which are targeted toward a specific group of
offenders, there is an immediate concern over possible
infringement on constitutionally protected Due Process
rights.
54
Courts and commentators have applied several tests
to determine what constitutes Due Process, among them are
the concepts of a historical basis, rational basis, and a
fundamental fairness basis for Due Process.5 5  First,
53 See, e.g., McKinney v. Rees, 993 F.2d 1378 (9th Cir. 1993) (finding
admission of character evidence in murder case violates Due Process
and is not harmless error). But see Huddleston v. United States, 485
U.S. 681, 686-87 (1988) (refusing to hold Federal Rule of Evidence
404(b) unconstitutional despite the fact that the jury could misuse other
acts character evidence).
54 The Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution guarantees
Due Process rights. However, as described below, one of the major
effects of the changes to the Federal Rules of Evidence is the parallel
modification of the state rules of evidence that has happened over the
past fifteen years. See infra Section V.b. Application of the Bill of
Rights to the States occurs by incorporation thru the Fourteenth
Amendment. See 16A AM. JUR. 2D Constitutional Law § 405 (1962).
55 See Louis M. Natali, Jr. & R. Stephen Stigall, "Are You Going to
Arraign His Whole Life? ": How Sexual Propensity Evidence Violates
the Due Process Clause, 28 LOy. U. CHI. L.J. 1, 23-34 (1996); Mark A.
Sheft, Federal Rule of Evidence 413: A Dangerous New Frontier, 33
AM. CRiM. L. REv. 57, 77-82 (1995).
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commentators have contended that Rules 413, 414, and 415
violate the "traditional notions of fair play and substantial
,,56justice, because American jurisprudence has a long
history of excluding character evidence that is "firmly
embedded in the Constitution." 57 Second, jurors can draw
inferences from the evidence that does not logically lead to
the result,58 and admitting evidence permits the jury to
make irrational and arbitrary inferences. 59  Due Process
requires that the rules of evidence in a criminal case
prohibit admission of evidence which does not pass the
"more likely than not" test.60 Finally, the admission of the
evidence violates the fundamental right to a fair trial,
because trial by character denies the defendant the "fair
opportunity to defend against a particular charge. ' 61 In
addition, there is the issue that Due Process may be
violated by an ex post facto law which changes the burden
of proof for crimes that have already happened.62 Despite
56 See, e.g., Burnham v. Superior Court, 495 U.S. 604, 619 (1990)
(finding that "the continuing traditions of our legal system [] define the
Due Process standard of traditional notions of fair play and substantial
justice.") (internal quotation marks omitted).
57 See Natali & Stigall, supra note 55, at 23-24.
58 For a discussion of the failure of prior bad acts to demonstrate
recidivism for sexual offenses, see infra Section IV.
59 See Natali & Stigall, supra note 55, at 24-28.
60 Leary v. United States, 395 U.S. 6, 36 (1969) ("[A] criminal statutory
presumption must be regarded as 'irrational' or 'arbitrary,' and hence
unconstitutional, unless it can at least be said with substantial assurance
that the presumed fact is more likely than not to flow from the proved
fact on which it is made to depend.") (citations omitted).
61 Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469, 476 (1948); Natali &
Stigall, supra note 55, at 24 (citing Michelson, 335 U.S. at 475-76).
See also Jason L. McCandless, Note, Prior Bad Acts and Two Bad
Rules: The Fundamental Unfairness of Federal Rules of Evidence 413
and 414, 5 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 689 (1997).
62 See, e.g., Carmell v. Texas, 529 U.S. 513, 552-53 (2000) (finding
that a Texas sexual offender law changed the evidentiary burden of
proof for the crimes, and thus application to crimes which occurred
17
7:1 Tennessee Journal of Law and Policy 39
the concerns of commentators shortly after the new rules
were passed,63 fifteen years later no courts have yet
determined that the additions to the Federal Rules of
Evidence violate the Due Process Clause.
64
b) Equal Protection for Sexual Offenders
65
The intent of Rules 413, 414, and 415 is to treat
sexual offenders differently than other types of criminals.
When legislation seeks to treat different classes of persons
differently, it immediately triggers Equal Protection
concerns. 66 Even proponents of Rules 413, 414, and 415
concede that they may violate the Equal Protection Clause
of the Constitution.67 When a statute distinguishes between
different classes of individuals, the issue is whether strict
scrutiny,68 intermediate scrutiny,69 or ordinary rational
before the law was passed violated the ex post facto law provision of
the United States Constitution).
63 Natali & Stigall, supra note 55; McCandless, supra note 61.
64 See, e.g., United States v. Castillo, 140 F.3d 874 (10th Cir. 1998);
United States v. Sandoval, 410 F. Supp. 2d 1071 (D. N.M. 2005).
65 Nobody likes a sexual offender, and the author does not suggest that
sexual offenders deserve any kind of special treatment. But "special
treatment" refers both to treatment with positive and negative
consequences. The reasons for prohibition against character evidence
in this section refer explicitly to prohibition of character evidence
targeted toward a specific group. Federal Rules of Evidence 413, 414,
and 415 specifically target sex offenders.
66 See Edward J. Imwinkelried, Undertaking the Task of Reforming the
American Character Evidence Prohibition: The Importance of Getting
the Experiment Off on the Right Foot, 22 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 285, 303
(1995) [hereinafter Reforming]; Sheft, supra note 55, at 82-86.
67 Danna, supra note 21, at 309.
68 The Court has typically limited strict scrutiny to racial classifications
or fundamental constitutional rights. See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388
U.S. 1 (1967). The Court has been reticent to add new classifications
where strict scrutiny applies.
69 See, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976). The rules would
survive heightened scrutiny if there is an important state interest and
the rule is substantially related to the state interest.
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basis scrutiny70 should apply. Although the rules pass
rational basis scrutiny,71 because the state interest of
keeping sexual offenders from repeating their offenses, the
rules could fail under intermediate scrutiny. In particular,
in Craig,72 the Court found that use of statistical evidence
to establish that a group had a higher probability to offend
was not substantially related to the rule and violated the
Equal Protection Clause.73 Presumably, Federal Rules of
Evidence 413, 414, and 415 could be attacked on the same
basis, although it appears that no successful attack on the
rules using Equal Protection grounds has yet been made.
74
2. Juror Prejudice
Ultimately, trials depend on the jurors making
rational decisions to come to a proper outcome. 75 At the
70 See, e.g., Railway Express Agency v. New York, 336 U.S. 106
(1949). The rules would survive rational basis scrutiny if there is a
legitimate state interest that was rationally related to the rule.
71 See United States v. Enjady, 134 F.3d 1427, 1432-33 (10th Cir.
1998) (applying rational basis scrutiny to Rules 413, 414, and 415).
See also United States v. Castillo, 140 F.3d 874, 883 (10th Cir. 1998)
(finding that rational basis test satisfied because of the government's
"need for corroborating evidence in cases of sexual abuse of a child
because of the highly secretive nature of these sex crimes and because
often the only available proof is the child's testimony.").
72 Craig, 429 U.S. at 190. In Craig, the Supreme Court declined to
allow the state of Oklahoma to treat boys differently than girls for the
purchase of alcohol when the state argued that statistically boys were
more likely than girls to drink and drive. Id. at 200-04.
73 Using this reasoning, arguments based on recidivism would fall into
intermediate scrutiny. Because the majority of the arguments for the
rules depend on statistical recidivism of criminals, theoretically they
should face an uphill battle on this front.
74 See United States v. LeMay, 260 F.3d 1018, 1019 (9th Cir. 2001)
(finding no Equal Protection violation); United States v. Castillo, 140
F.3d 874, 874-75 (10th Cir. 1998) (same); United States v. Enjady, 134
F.3d 1427, 1432-33 (4th Cir. 1998) (same); United States v. Sandoval,
410 F. Supp. 2d 1071, 1075 (D. N.M. 2005) (same).
75 If jurors behaved perfectly rationally, the rules of evidence, save,
perhaps Federal Rule of Evidence 105, which provides for "limiting
19
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same time, it is well known that jurors do not always act
rationally.76 The law has adopted protections to overcome
this problem. For example, to prevent juror misuse of
evidence, the Federal Rules of Evidence require that
evidence be excluded if the "probative value is
substantially outweighed" by, among other things, "the
danger of unfair prejudice. 77
In the context of balancing prejudice against
probativeness, it is necessary to consider the susceptibility
of jurors to common cognitive biases78 that can cause
erroneous decisions. If the admitted evidence is susceptible
to misuse, it should be excluded.
Jurors are human and are susceptible cognitive
biases. Before discussing the types of bounded rationality
79
to which jurors are susceptible, it is useful to consider when
people are most susceptible to decisions that show aspects
instructions," would be unnecessary. All evidence would be given to
the jury, and the judge could tell the jury which evidence should be
excluded or given little weight ex post. See generally Charles L.
Barzun, Rules of Weight, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1957 (2008)
(arguing that rules of weight may be a better system of evidence than
rules based on admissibility). Such a model would be similar to
appellate courts reviewing decisions of bench trials. For appellate
cases, the presumption is that, after hearing the evidence, the judge
gave no weight to evidence to which an objection was made.
76 See, e.g., Donald C. Langvoort, Behavioral Theories of Judgment
and Decision Making in Legal Scholarship: A Literature Review, 51
VAND. L. REV. 1499 (1998).
77 FED. R. EVID. 403. For examples of cases with excluded propensity
evidence, see generally 22 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & KENNETH W.
GRAHAM, JR., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, EVIDENCE § 5239
(3d ed.) (collecting cases).
78 Arguably, cognitive biases give rise to irrational choices. For a list
of common cognitive biases and their application to economic choices,
see Matthew Rabin, Psychology & Economics, 36 J. ECON. LIT. 11-46
(1998).
79 See, e.g., Russell B. Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen, Law and
Behavioral Science: Removing the Rationality Assumption from Law
and Economics, 88 CAL. L. REV. 1051, 1075-1102 (2000).
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of cognitive biases. People tend to use simplifying
heuristics when the decision involves choices between
complex options. Trials with two sides presenting
alternate theories are inherently complex, and jurors are
typically not familiar with the issues involved. Frequently,
the jury instructions are confusing to legal scholars-
suggesting that jurors will have great difficulty arriving at a
proper conclusion. 8 1 One would expect that, given their
difficult task, jurors would employ heuristic shortcuts to
help in their decision making.
In addition, people make irrational choices when
they are subject to highly emotional decisions.8 2  While
litigators should try not to inflame the passions of the jury,
in some situations it is unavoidable. Evidence that is
simply so inflammatory that it will inspire a jury to convict
based on unfair prejudice should be excluded.
There are two ways that jurors may misuse prior
acts character evidence. Juror prejudices have been termed
"inferential prejudice," 83  where the trier of fact
overestimates the value of the evidence and comes to the
wrong conclusion, and "nullification prejudice," 84 where
the trier of fact convicts a person simply for being a bad
80 1d. at 1076-84.
81 See generally Peter Tiersma, Asking Jurors to do the Impossible, 5:2
TENN. J. L. & POL'Y 105 (2009) (symposium issue) (discussing the
difficult tasks asked of thejury during trial and deliberation).
82 Criminal trials are inherently highly emotional, and trials involving
sexual misconduct are even more so. In a survey that asked which
crimes were the most serious, rape and child abuse trailed only murder
in "seriousness." Joseph A. Aluise, Note, Evidence of Prior Sexual
Misconduct in Sexual Assault and Child Molestation Proceedings: Did
Congress Err in Passing Federal Rules of Evidence 413, 414, and
415?, 14 J. L. & POL. 153, 190-91 (1998). As such, one might expect
that jurors will fall prey to emotional decision making, particularly in
sexual offender trials.
83 Roger C. Park, Character at the Crossroads, 49 HASTINGS L.J. 717,
720 (1998). See also Reforming, supra note 66, at 296-98.
84 Park, supra note 83, at 720.
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individual. While the mechanism by which the trier of fact
reaches an improper conclusion is different, when jurors
misuse evidence the outcome is the same-an incorrect
verdict based on misuse of prejudicial evidence.
a) Attribution Error and Base Rate Fallacy
"[A]ttribution error causes human decision-makers
to attribute too much importance to dispositions, and to
overlook situational influences." 85 Essentially, attribution
error means that people naturally gravitate toward a "trait
theory" rather than a "situational" approach when
predicting people's behavior.86  However, experiments
have shown that a perceived natural trait toward altruism
can be overcome by simple situational pressures.
87
Not only do people tend to rely more on
dispositions, but they fall prey to "Base Rate Fallacy" 88 and
give more weight to a trait than it merits. 89 For instance,
Kahneman and Tversky showed that a sample of
psychology students asked to predict what field a person
85 Id. at 738.
86Trait theory suggests that people have natural dispositions, or traits,
which control their behavior. See infra Section III.d.
87 This fallibility of "trait theory" in a "situational" setting was
demonstrated in the classic "good Samaritan" study. When
seminarians were confronted with a person in need of assistance, the
fact that they were in a hurry dominated the trait of altruism. See John
M. Darley & C. Daniel Batson, From Jerusalem to Jericho: A Study of
Situational and Dispositional Variables in Helping Behavior, 27 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 100 (1973).
88 Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, On the Psychology of
Prediction, 80 PSYCHOL. REv. 237-38 (1973).
89 Park, supra note 83, at 740. Park describes this as the "interview
illusion" after experiments conducted by Ross and Nisbett. When
asked about the capabilities of a prospective employee, interviewers
gave more weight to the personality information that they got in a short
interview than other information that might be more relevant-the
student's grades in school. Id. at 740. See also Korobkin & Ulen,
supra note 79, at 1087 (applying base rate fallacy and
representativeness heuristic to character evidence).
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studied in graduate school based their predictions on a
description of the "personality sketch" that suggested a
person was studying computer science, despite the fact that
such an outcome was much less probable than other
outcomes, such as the person being a graduate student in
education.90 A person's intuition "violates the statistical
rules of prediction."
91
The Federal Rules of Evidence recognize the
importance of correcting for these cognitive errors
implicitly, if not explicitly. For instance, in the case of
hearsay evidence, a liberally applied Rule 40292 would
classify as relevant almost all statements made out of court
and "offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter
asserted., 93  However, the Rules of Evidence explicitly
declare that hearsay is "not admissible" 94 without an
exception. The exclusion of hearsay evidence follows
because it is generally recognized that "juries might accord
it more weight than it deserves." 95 The exceptions to the
general exclusion of hearsay evidence exist because there is
some other factor which gives the evidence some indicia of
reliability,9 6 or would give the defendant an opportunity to
90 Kahneman & Tversky, supra note 88, at 237. The total number of
graduate students in education greatly exceeds the number in computer
science.
91 Id. at 238.
92 "All relevant evidence is admissible, except as otherwise provided.
. bythese rules." FED. R. EvID. 402.
93 FED. R. EVID. 801.
94 FED. R. EVID. 802.
95 Barzun, supra note 75, at 1994.
96 See FED. R. EvID. 803, 804. The rule "proceeds upon the theory that
under appropriate circumstances a hearsay statement may possess
circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness." FED. R. EVID. 803
advisory committee's note. For example, the hearsay rules assume that
a patient has no incentive to lie to his doctor in making statements for
medical diagnosis or treatment, and thus such statements would be
reliable. FED. R. EVID. 803(4).
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contest the accuracy of the statements.
97
In the context of evidence classified as "other acts,"
presenting a juror with a list of prior offenses plays to the
juror's natural tendency to accept this evidence of a bad
character "trait" as being indicative of the likelihood that
the accused is a sexual predator, even though the "base
rate" of sexual offenders is very low. In addition, jurors are
likely to assess more weight to this highly prejudicial
evidence than other, perhaps more relevant, situational
evidence. In essence, cognitive error leads jurors to rely on
their intuition that criminals are naturally recidivist, and
jurors may accept evidence of "other acts" character
evidence acts as more valuable than it really is.
9 8
b) Confirmation Bias
Confirmation bias is a heuristic whereby people
examine the evidence but attribute more weight to the
evidence which confirms their beliefs. The tendency to
believe data that supports a desired (or sought after)
conclusion has been known for hundreds of years,99 but the
mechanism by which it occurs has only been more recently
investigated. Sometimes confirmation bias simply results
97 For instance, in the case of an admissible "admission by party
opponent," FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2), the defendant has the opportunity
to demonstrate that the hearsay is untruthful through the adversarial
system. FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2) advisory committee's note.
98 Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 79, at 1087.
99 In 1620, Francis Bacon wrote,
The human understanding when it has once adopted
an opinion. . . draws all things else to support and
agree with it. And though there be a greater number
and weight of instances to be found on the other side,
yet these it either neglects or despises, or else by
some distinction sets aside or rejects[.]
Raymond S. Nickerson, Confirmation Bias: A Ubiquitous
Phenomenon in Many Guises, 2 REv. GEN. PSYCHOL. 175 (1998).
24
7:1 Tennessee Journal of Law and Policy 46
from "wishful thinking."100  In other cases, confirmation
bias results from a "representativeness" or "availability"
heuristic. 10 1  In this latter instance, individuals may
subconsciously choose an option based on "known patterns
without questioning whether the previous pattern has
relevance in predicting future events," or by assuming facts
that are readily memorable are more reliable. 102 Regardless
of the source of the bias, when an individual thinks that a
decision should come out with a particular outcome,
evidence which supports that conclusion may be adopted
and given greater weight than it merits.
10 3
In the context of "other acts" character evidence, it
is clear how this mechanism can prejudice the jury. The
prosecution is typically the first to present its case 10 4 and
has the opportunity to set a "goal,"10 5 for which the jury can
then collect and assess evidence. After establishing the
goal, a prosecutor can then present "other acts" evidence
which will have a greater chance to be accepted by a juror
who is looking for reasons to convict a defendant. With the
idea of conviction in mind, other acts will present a juror
100 Essentially, this means that a person believes the result that the
individual wants to see. See, e.g. id.
101 John E. Montgomery, Cognitive Biases and Heuristics in Tort
Litigation: A Proposal to Limit Their Effects Without Changing the
World, 85 NEB. L. REv. 15, 23 (2006).
102 Id.
103 Confirmation bias is present in all populations. Even scientists (of
which the author is one), a group who on the whole are supposed to be
rigorous, analytic, rational, and mathematical thinkers are susceptible to
the effects of confirmation bias. See Monwhea Jeng, A Selected
History of Expectation Bias in Physics, 74 AM. J. PHYSICS 578, 578
(2006).
104 This is also an example of "primacy" where the first thing that a
person hears is more likely to be remembered. See James Deese &
Roger A. Kaufinan, Serial Effects in Recall of Unorganized and
Sequentially Organized Verbal Material, 54 J. EXPERIMENTAL
PSYCHOL. 180 (1957).
'05 In the context of a criminal trial, the "goal" for the prosecution is
naturally the adjudication of guilt of the defendant.
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with a ready catalogue of easily remembered evidence that
supports the guilt of the defendant.
III. Rationalizations for Federal Rules 413, 414 and 415
Even though there are compelling reasons why
"other acts" character evidence should be excluded, there
are a number of reasons why commentators have suggested
it should be admitted. The fundamental premise behind
these reasons is that the evidence is relevant, accurate, and
most importantly, it serves the interest of justice because it
prevents a guilty individual from getting away with a
crime.
a. Political Expedience
It is safe to say that nobody likes a sex offender.
10 6
In particular, nobody likes a repeat sexual offender.
Politicians, who need the approval of the voting population
to keep their jobs, have a strong incentive to vote for acts
that punish groups who are disliked. In the months leading
up to the passage of Federal Rules of Evidence 413, 414,
and 415, the news was full of stories about the acquittal of
William Kennedy Smith after evidence of prior sexual
offenses was excluded from his state trial. 10 7 In the floor
debate for the passage of the rules, senators and
representatives played to the public passions surrounding
the inadmissibility of "other acts" character evidence.
106 See Aluise, supra note 82, at 190-91 (describing a poll where rape
and child abuse were ranked only behind murder in "heinousness").
107 See Karp, supra note 30, at 15-17. This article is instructive in
pointing out a number of prominent cases where acquittals followed
exclusion of propensity evidence. It is also instructive to note that this
article was written by the author of Federal Rules 413, 414, and 415.
See also Aluise, supra note 82, at 190-93 (recounting numerous
examples of repeat sexual offenders).
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Cases cited included People v. Hansen,10 8 Getz v. State,10 9
State v. Pace,"l0 the case of Megan Kanka,"' l and Susan
Harrison. 112  All of these cases involved repeat sexual
offenders, and the floor debate was framed in a way that
inflamed the passions of the public against the judiciary."l
3
Given the public backlash against the judiciary, it is
not surprising that Congress would act to gather popular
support. When the rules were passed, the Clinton
Presidency was "floundering" and "the Democratic
leadership in Congress desperately sought to enhance their
public standing." 1  The public backlash against the
judiciary gave Congress a perfect opportunity to gather
108 People v. Hansen, 708 P.2d 468, 471 (Colo. App. 1985) (finding
admission of prior telephone calls to minor girls was reversible error in
trial of defendant accused of child prostitution).
109 Getz v. State, 538 A.2d 726, 735 (Del. 1988) (reversing conviction
of defendant for rape of his eleven year old daughter because testimony
about prior sexual contact with daughter was inadmissible).
110 State v. Pace, 275 S.E.2d 254, 257 (N.C. Ct. App. 1981) (ordering
new trial for Pace, who had been convicted of rape and murder,
because admission of testimony by another woman who had claimed
that the defendant raped her was reversible error).
... State v. Timmendequas, 737 A.2d 55, 172 (N.J. 1999) (defendant, a
repeat child sex offender, was convicted of raping and murdering
Megan Kanka). This is the case that led to passage of "Megan's Law"
which requires convicted sex offenders to register. See Jacob
Wetterling Crimes Against Children and Sexually Violent Offender
Registration Program, 42 U.S.C. § 14071(d) (1994). The law required
all states to pass sexual offender registration legislation at the risk of
losing federal funding. Since the passage of the act, every state has
complied with the federal mandate. Kimberly B. Wilkins, Sex Offender
Registration and Community Notification Laws: Will these Laws
Survive?, 37 U. RICH. L. REV. 1245 (2003).
112 Susan Harrison was murdered by a two time convicted rapist, Jerry
Walter McFadden. Michael Teter, Acts of Emotion: Analyzing
Congressional Involvement in the Federal Rules of Evidence, 58 CATH.
U. L. REv. 153, 180 (2008).
113 For discussion of the politics surrounding the passage of the rules,
see id.
114 See id. at 179.
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public backing to change the rules of evidence to punish a
particularly despised group. In the words of David J. Karp,
who drafted the rules, "statements supporting the legislative
proposal have pointed to the strength of the public interest
in admitting all significant evidence of guilt in sex offense
cases."I 15
The political goal was evidenced by the way the
rules went into effect. Typically, rules are promulgated
through a five-step process: "proposal by the Advisory
Committee, a period of public debate and comment,
Supreme Court adoption, and finally Congressional review
and approval." ' 1 6 At the time of passage, the rules were
opposed by the "overwhelming majority" of legal
scholars. 117 Nonetheless, rather than following the usual
procedure for deliberation and consideration, the Violent
Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994 bypassed
the procedure of input from the Judicial Conference."' In
their rush"19 to gather public support, Congress instituted
115 Karp, supra note 30, at 20.
116 Aluise, supra note 82, at 159-60. See 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (2000).
117 Report of the Judicial Conference, supra note 3, at 52.
"1 Some might argue that there was input from the Judicial Conference
because the text of the act permitted the Judicial Conference to
comment on the rules. However, the rules also provided that they
would go into effect regardless of what the Judicial Conference said.
As a result, the ability of the Judicial Conference to comment had no
teeth. See, supra note 22.
119 The normal procedure for amendment of the rules has five levels of
review. Aluise, supra note 82, at 159-60. However, in the case of
Rules 413,414, and 415:
a practice that often takes three years or more and
inspires serious comment and debate within the legal
community was completed after twenty minutes of
floor debate in the United States Senate, after one
exhaustive marathon weekend in the House of
Representatives, with no public hearings held on the
matter, and with no serious consideration of the
potential ramifications of the changes.
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new rules that bypassed the basic protections put into place
by Rule 404 and set up rules designed to apply exclusively
to a targeted group.
It has also been suggested that Congress acted with
the goal of promoting "justice" and "achieving [increased]
consistency in the law."' 20 While these public policy goals
are laudable, the circumstances surrounding the passage of
the new rules suggest that Congress was looking to
something other than public policy when they passed the
rules. Congress declined to take the advice of the Advisory
Committee-the group that was the best equipped to
interpret and modify the rules-and passed the rules to
support its own political agenda. The proponents of the bill
openly spoke of their agenda-to put a thumb on the scales
of justice and tip the balance in favor of the prosecution:
"there is a problem with the rules of evidence with regard
to the ability to get the kind of background necessary to get
convictions ,121 The proponents of the rules were
relying on the belief that convictions in sexual assault cases
are more difficult to obtain than other types of crimes.
However, the statistical evidence does not support this
premise.
122
Teter, supra note 112, at 180.
120 See Karen M. Fingar, And Justice For All: The Admissibility of
Uncharged Sexual Misconduct Evidence Under the Recent Amendment
to the Federal Rules of Evidence, 5 S. CAL. REv. L. & WOMEN'S STUD.
501, 508 (1996).
121 Representative Bill McCullum, quoted in Teter, supra note 112, at
186.
122 See infra Figures 1-3 and Section V.c on the effect of the rules on
conviction and plea rates.
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b. Protection of Victims Unwilling or Unable to
Testify
Commentators have suggested that victims of
sexual crimes are unable or unwilling to testify. 123 Studies
have shown that the majority of rapes go unreported.
12 4
Part of the reason for the low rate of reports of rate is an
apparent "chilling effect" based on the perceived
unresponsiveness of the judicial system. 125 Moreover, rape
is a clandestine crime where the victims "endure greater
physical and emotional trauma than do victims of most
other crimes." 126 Thus, proponents argue that because of
the "unique nature of sex crimes" allowing prior sexual
misconduct evidence "insure[s] . . . greater justice will be
done for victims of sex crimes.
' 127
In addition to a providing a measure of justice for
victims of sexual offenses, the drafter of the rules suggested
that Federal Rule of Evidence 414 is particularly important
because it deals with sex offenses against children. 128 The
additional justification for this rule is that child molestation
"cases regularly present the need to rely on the testimony of
a child victim-witness whose credibility can readily be
123 See, e.g. Fingar, supra note 120. But see Reforming, supra note 66,
at 299 ("[I]n prosecutions for sexual misconduct or child molestation,
there is usually a victim capable of testifying at trial.").
124 See Fingar, supra note 120, at 503-04 (citing statistics on reports of
rapes).
125 Id.
126 Id. at 537. Of course, if it was the trauma to the victims that
mattered, one might frame the rules of evidence according to the value
of the crime, and the admissibility of character evidence would differ
for shoplifting and car theft because of the different costs of the crimes.
However, another author points out Rules 413, 414, and 415 have no
applicability to murder which, judged by the fact that it can carry the
death penalty, is judged the most serious of all crimes. See Reforming,
supra note 66, at 299 (1995).
127 Fingar, supra note 120, at 537.
128 Karp, supra note 30, at 21.
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attacked in the absence of substantial corroboration.'
129
This rationale suggests that it should be unnecessary for the
accuser to testify, and instead the prosecution should be
able to put on more credible witnesses who can serve as
proxies. Such a strategy violates the fundamental right of
the accused to confront his accuser, one of the hallmarks of
American jurisprudence.
3 0
c. Law and Economics Rationale
The "Law and Economics" analytic method is the
quintessential rational choice model. The method is
founded on neoclassical economics and assumes that actors
compare among the various options and rationally make the
best possible choice.' 31 This assumption can be applied to
character evidence as either an incentive model or a cost
minimization model, described below.
1. Incentive Model
Sanchiro has considered the law and economics
approach for prohibition of using character evidence. 3 2 He
argues that the result of the prohibition is that it creates a
disincentive toward refraining from the undesirable
behavior. 133  This objective intent is independent of the
effect on the finders of fact. 134  Curiously, Sanchiro's
analysis holds that even if character evidence does, in fact,
have predictive value, the actual predictive value of the
evidence is irrelevant when considering a disincentive for
1 2 9 
id.
130 See, e.g., Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004).
131 See generally RICHARD A. POSNER, AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF THE
LAW (5th ed. 1998). However, citing behavioral psychology results,
not all commentators agree with the approach of treating actors as
perfectly rational. See, e.g., Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 79.
132 Chris William Sanchiro, Character Evidence and the Object of
Trial, 101 COLUM. L. REv. 1227 (2001).
"' Id. at 1265.
134 Id.
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bad behavior. Under Sanchiro's disincentive model, a
person who has a prior instance of bad character which
would be admissible would be in a "damned if you do,
damned if you don't" situation, and there is no disincentive
to commit a crime.
135
However, this analysis fails to take into account that
there is an incentive for the person with prior "bad"
character to stay out of any situation where they might be
arrested, because the individual knows that an arrest will
bring in the "other acts" character evidence and increase
the chance of conviction. 136  As a result, there is an
incentive to avoid situations which could lead to arrest.
The Sanchiro incentive theory can equally well be applied
to either deter or promote bad acts by a person with a prior
record.
Under either of these approaches, the model
assumes that the actor is making a rational choice. The
assumption is that the actor has an understanding of the
relevant rules of evidence, or at least a sufficient
knowledge to make a rational and informed decision.
However, it is unlikely that most offenders have a thorough
understanding of the rules of evidence. Even if they did,
when deciding on a course of action it is unlikely that
offenders take into account the possible admissibility of
their other acts.
2. Cost Minimization Model
Posner has approached the character evidence ban
from the perspective of cost minimization. Posner
135Id. at 1266.
136 One can consider this in the context of an alleged child molester. If
a person has been previously accused of child molestation, he or she
may consider the costs and benefits of being alone with children in a
suspicious situation. Here, the cost of a long prison term could be
thought of as outweighing the benefits, assuming the purported
offender has adequate self control.
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calculates the benefit as probability of an error 37 as a
function of the evidence admitted, p(x) times the "stakes"
of a trial, S, which should be independent of the
evidence. 138 The overall societal benefit is then B(x) = p(x)
S + c(x), where c is the cost of error avoidance. 39 The
object would then be to optimize the benefit, B(x), as a
function of the evidence admitted, x. The optimum value is
then obtained 140 when px S = -cx, where the subscripts
represent the derivatives with respect to the evidence, x.14
Posner asserts that prior criminal conduct is
probative of whether or not a person has committed a new
crime, and suggests that because the stakes, S, go up for a
repeat offender, if the increased cost to the offender is
sufficient, "the propensity to commit a subsequent offense
may be reduced to the same level as the propensity to
commit a first offense."' 42  This effect is essentially the
same as the Sanchiro incentive theory, and again relies on
the fact that the offender is fully apprised of the
admissibility of the evidence.
At the same time, Posner recognizes that even
without the effect on the actor, there is a problem with a
jury misusing the "other acts" character evidence to arrive
137 An "erroneous rather than a correct outcome." Richard A. Posner,
An Economic Approach to the Law of Evidence, 51 STAN. L. REV.
1477, 1484 (1999).
13 8 /d. at 1481.
139 Id. at 1484.
140 There are several mathematical assumptions on which the model
depends. The most important is that the second derivative of B with
respect to x is negative, and Posner assumes that it remains so over the
full range of the evidence admitted, x. Otherwise, B(x) would not have
a maximum.
141 Id. at 1484-85. In actuality, the optimization would normally take
place with respect to all of the other variables in the system, so the
derivatives are best considered as partial derivatives holding all other
variables constant. However, in a model system such as the Posner
model, a true multivariate analysis is unnecessary.
142 Posner, supra note 137, at 1525.
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at an incorrect outcome. Posner suggests that one must
minimize the cost of a trial error. 143 If the cost of a new
trial is T, and the probability that the evidence will lead to a
wrongful conviction with admission of evidence x is p(x),
the expected benefit, the reduced cost, is C= p(x) T + c(x),
where c(x) is the error avoidance cost. The object of the
cost minimization model is to minimize the total cost,
which occurs where Tpx = -cx. Such a calculation amounts
to minimizing the cost associated to admission of evidence
which causes the jury to make a poor decision. 144 Posner's
analysis suggests 45 that evidence should be admitted up to
the point where the cost of error avoidance for the
admission exceeds the trial costs times the probability of an
error.
Posner rationalizes Federal Rules of Evidence 413,
414, and 415 because using the "other acts" character
evidence in sexual offender cases is more reliable than not
using it, 146 whereas for a thief, he contends that the
evidence is not reliable:'
47
143 Posner focuses on the procedural costs. There are, of course, other
costs unrelated to the trial. The cost to the wrongfully convicted
individual stands out. There are other costs, as well, such as
compensation paid to the wrongfully convicted individual. Twenty five
states have statutes which compensate people who have been wrongly
convicted. See Adele Bernhard, A Short Overview of the Statutory
Remedies for the Wrongly Convicted: What Works, What Doesn 't, and
Why, 18 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 403, 409 (2009).
'"Again, there are certain assumptions in the model, such as that the
second derivative of the total cost with respect to the admission of the
evidence is positive.
141 Posner makes an assumption here that increasing evidence, x,
results in a decreasing probability of error, p(x), and that the cost of
error avoidance is not decreasing.
146 Essentially, this means that the probability of error, p(x), decreases
with the admission of the evidence.
147 Or, in the context of the probability of error, p(x) does not
decrease--or at least does not increase.
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Unlike a molester, a thief, unless he is a
kleptomaniac, does not have an
overwhelming desire to steal. Theft is
merely instrumental to his desire for money,
and there are many substitute instruments.
Committing a prior theft does not show that
a defendant "likes" theft and so does not
furnish a motive for his committing the
current theft with which he is charged.
148
The premise of Posner's analysis can be extended
beyond the realm of sexual crimes. The logical conclusion
is that if reliability and predictive value was the premise for
the special prior sexual conduct rules, we should allow
propensity evidence for any crime influenced by a person's
needs, likes, or desires. Thus, we would presumably allow
evidence of prior drug abuse in a case involving heroin
possession, or perhaps evidence of prior public intoxication
in the case of a person charged with driving under the
influence. 149  Posner's argument for Federal Rules of
Evidence 413, 414, and 415 implicitly relies on the
accuracy of the past conduct of predicting future conduct.
Or, simply put, persons who have committed sexual
misconduct are more likely to be recidivists than those who
148 Posner, supra note 137, at 1525-26. It is interesting that Posner falls
back to the language of "motive." If motive was the reason for the
admission of the forbidden evidence, the evidence permitted by Federal
Rules of Evidence 413, 414, and 415 would be permitted as motive
evidence under Rule 404(b).
149 Here, the analogy may be a bit strained, because it is necessary to
compare evidence of prior public intoxication with driving under the
influence. In an actual DUI case, many states have laws which make a
later DUI conviction a different, and more serious, offense than a first.
As a result, the conviction of a prior DUI offense would be admissible
as an element of the crime, and would not necessarily be admitted to
prove "action in conformity therewith." FED. R. EVID. 404.
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have committed other crimes. In the following sections, we
will see how this fundamental assumption is flawed.
150
Using the Posner cost minimization model, one
could also posit that the reason the evidence should be
admitted is that the cost of allowing a sexual predator go
free is extraordinary high. In this case, even a small
probability, p, would be multiplied by a very large T (where
T includes the societal burden) and thus the shift would be
to admitting evidence with a very small probability of error,
because the product could overcome the error avoidance
cost. However, if this were the case, one would expect
similar exceptional rules allowing "other acts" character
evidence for other "high cost" crimes, such as murder.
Given that the drafters of the rules chose only to weigh the
reliability of the evidence, and not the societal cost, it is
unlikely that the drafters considered this rationalization ex
ante.
d. Prior Conduct is Predictive of Future Behavior
Perhaps the most widely used reason that prior
sexual misconduct character evidence should be admitted is
that it is relevant to predict conduct. Courts have accepted
that propensity evidence is relevant.151 For example, one of
the indicators of whether a person is likely to commit a
crime in the future is whether that individual has committed
a crime in the past: "he did it once, therefore he did it
again."'152 The question is not whether the evidence sought
is relevant, the question is whether it is too relevant.
153
150 See infra Section IV.
151 See, e.g., Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469, 475-76 (1948);
United States v. Guardia, 135 F.3d 1326, 1328 (10th Cir. 1998); United
States v. Beechum, 582 F.2d 898, 910 (5th Cir. 1978); Edward J.
Irmwinkelried, A Small Contribution to the Debate over the Proposed
Legislation Abolishing the Character Evidence Prohibition in Sex
Offense Prosecutions, 44 SYRACUSE L. REv. 1125, 1129 (1993).
152 Edward J. Imwinkelried, An Evidentiary Paradox: Defending the
Character Evidence Prohibition by Upholding a Non-Character
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Of course, this premise is nonspecific and does not
indicate a probability to commit a specific act or type of
act, but more likely a general disregard for societal norms.
Additionally, a person's general bad character in the past
has not been shown to predict future lawlessness on a
specific occasion.154 For instance, if a person has been
accused of adultery in the past, is it predictive of a desire
for immoral conduct in general, a desire to commit
adultery, or is it perhaps simply a desire for a relationship
with another person-who just happens to be married to
someone else? While a past offense may be a reliable
predictor of commission of future offenses, it may have
little probative value for a specific offense and is not
probative of the result.
The reasoning behind the predictive accuracy in the
case of sexual misconduct, as stated by Posner and those
who subscribe to the "lustful disposition" theory,' 1 5 is that
the nature of a sexual offender is such that they are bound
to repeatedly commit sexual offenses. This reasoning is the
basis by which evidence of prior acts is considered more
reliable in the case of a sex offense than in the case of some
other type of offense.
The idea that sex offenders are incurable predators
has found its way into the popular media, 156 and has been
Theory of Logical Relevance, The Doctrine of Chances, 40 U. RICH. L.
REV. 419, 426 (2006) [hereinafter Doctrine of Chances].
153 Michelson, 335 U.S. at 475-76.
154 See 1 EDWARD J. IMWINKELRIED, UNCHARGED MISCONDUCT
EVIDENCE § 2:19, at 2-118 n.28 (Thompson West 2006) (collecting
studies showing that there is little correlation between a person's
general character and his behavior on a specific occasion).
155 See supra notes 49-52 and accompanying text.
156 For instance, one of the highest rated television dramas on the
National Broadcasting Company ("NBC") network for the last ten
years has been Law & Order, SVU, which relates the workings of the
sex crimes unit of a fictional New York police precinct. Many of the
episodes are based on real life cases which have been in the news,
reinforcing the idea that sex crimes have a high base rate and that the
37
7:1 Tennessee Journal of Law and Policy 59
widely cited-particularly in the civil commitments of
"sexual predators."' 157 This reasoning has been justified on
the basis of psychological studies. Those who subscribe to
the psychological "trait theory" approach suggest that
persons have "stable internal elements" which influence
their behavior over a wide range of situations.158 However,
research shows that trait theory is incapable of predicting
behavior. For example, the theory could not be used to
correctly predict when school children would cheat.
159
Trait theory, treated in the most basic sense, is essentially a
probabilistic theory-it does not speak to whether a person
actually committed the specific act in question, but rather
shows the likelihood that a person committed the act.
Other researchers have suggested that
"situationalism" dominates behavior. 16  This approach
suggests that behavior is highly situation dependent, and
small changes in the situation can result in dramatic
changes in behavior. 161  Thus, past behavior is a poor




157 See generally Aman Abluwalia, Civil Commitment of Sexually
Violent Predators: The Search for a Limiting Principle, 4 CARDOZO
PUB. L. POL'Y & ETHICS J. 489 (2006).
158 See Edward J. Imwinkelried, Reshaping the "Grotesque" Doctrine
of Character Evidence: The Reform Implications of the Most Recent
Psychological Research, 36 Sw. U. L. REV. 741, 747-50 (2008)
[hereinafter Grotesque]. See also Waller, supra note 49, at 1511-13
(discussing application of trait theory to reliability of evidence).
159 See Grotesque, supra note 158, at 748 (2008). In the context of the
current discussion, situationalism would suggest that sexual misconduct
in the past is not suggestive of sexual misconduct in the future. See
also Waller, supra note 49, at 1511-13. Note that Rules 413, 414, and
415 do not explicitly require that the prior act be "similar." Evidence
of an adult rape could be used in a child rape case, and vice versa.
160 Grotesque, supra note 158, at 749-51. See also Waller, supra note
49, at 1513-15.
161 See Grotesque, supra note 158, at 749-51.
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predictor of future behavior when the situation surrounding
the events is different. For instance, a college student may
be arrested for driving home drunk from a fraternity party.
However, drunk driving after attending a fraternity party is
hardly predictive of drunk driving after taking an exam in
philosophy. The facts and circumstances surrounding the
situation matter. 62 The situationalism approach appears to
be what the drafters of the original Federal Rules of
Evidence subscribed to when they excluded "other acts"
character evidence in Rule 404, before the addition of
Rules 413, 414, and 415.163
The current psychological literature suggests that
"interactionism," a blend between the two extremes, is
probably the best theory. Interactionism suggests that
people have a "psychic structure" that interacts with the
situation to produce results.' 64 Nonetheless, even using this
more modem approach, behavior is far from "predictable,"
because the theory depends on a "learned" response to a
stimuli or situation.1 65 If the learned stimulus is absent, the
individual would not be expected to perform in the
predicted fashion.
e. Doctrine of Chances
With the failure of psychological theories to predict
behavior, commentators have begun to rely on alternative
162 Which is not, of course, to excuse the behavior of the drunk driver.
The offender should be punished according to the law. The point here
is that an act committed under one set of circumstances may have little
probative value in a future case.
163 Of course, "situationalism" could also be spun in favor of the new
rules. For instance, situationalism hinges on people performing
similarly in similar situations. Under this theory, a child molester left
alone with a victim might be expected to take the opportunity to molest
the child, if he had done so in a similar situation in the past.
164 See Grotesque, supra note 158, at 747-52. See also Waller, supra
note 49, at 1515-17.
165 See Waller, supra note 49, at 1515-17.
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methods to justify admission of past conduct character
evidence based on the traditional exceptions to the prior
acts character evidence ban. The "doctrine of chances"'
166
argues that it is implausible that a person would
accidentally commit a sexual offense on several occasions,
or be so unlucky to be falsely accused of the same sexual
offense on a later occasion. 167  However, this same
treatment could just as easily be applied to other crimes, so
it does not necessarily justify a distinction in the admission
of "other acts" evidence for sexual crimes as compared to
other types of crimes.
Moreover, the doctrine of chances is not properly
considered as admission of prior acts to show character in
conformity therewith, but rather as an absence of mistake
or accident,' 68 a longstanding exception to the prohibition
against "other acts" character evidence. For instance, when
a person is accused of statutory rape, a common defense is
that the offender did not know that the victim was
underage. 169 Such a scenario is a classic example of the
"mistake" defense. The Federal Rules of Evidence permit
the admission of evidence to prove an "absence of
mistake."' 70 An offender who claims "I didn't know how
old she was" on repeat occasions will find no solace in the
rule excluding character evidence to prove conformity, as
the evidence will be admitted to prove absence of mistake.
There is no need for a special rule to admit evidence of the
166 See, e.g., Doctrine of Chances, supra note 152. The concept of the
"doctrine of chances" appears in the "absence of mistake or accident"
language of Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b).
167 See Fingar, supra note 120, at 531. Of course, this is a probabilistic
argument that flies in the face of the protections of Federal Rule of
Evidence 404, which limits the possibility of any probabilistic
determination of guilt by a finder of fact.
'6 8 See FED. R. EVID. 404(b).
169 In many states, mistake is not a defense to statutory rape because
statutory rape is a strict liability offense requiring no sceinter.
170 FED R. EvID. 404(b).
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prior accusations of sexual offenders in "doctrine of
chances" cases, because the Federal Rules of Evidence
already provide an exception to provide for admission of
relevant evidence in this case.
IV. Recidivism of Sexual Offenders
The common themes running between the various
rationalizations for allowing prior sexual misconduct
evidence is that victims of sex crimes need special
protection and that sexual offenders are natural born
recidivists. The assumption is that, in the case of sexual
offenders, past behavior is predictive of future behavior.
As described above, jurors are subject to cognitive
biases, and they attribute greater reliability to recidivism
than it actually deserves. 171 In particular, because Federal
Rules of Evidence 413, 414, and 415 are special rules of
admissibility of evidence against sexual offenders and do
not apply to other types of criminal offenses, the rules have
a built-in assumption that sexual offenders are more likely
to be repeat offenders than people who commit other types
of crimes. This assumption merits additional
investigation.172
Before considering the data on recidivism, which is
in itself controversial, 1 7 3 it is necessary to point out some of
the flaws pertaining to statistics on repeat offenders. To
begin, there are concerns with the accuracy of the data.'
74
Different studies measure different statistics. For instance,
171 See supra Section II.b.2
172 The idea that sexual offenders are "predators" appears to be a
relatively new invention. As late as the mid 1980s, the consensus was
that sexual offenders were not more likely to reoffend than other
criminals. See Aluise, supra note 82, at 173-74.
173 See 1 EDWARD J. IMWINKELRIED, UNCHARGED MISCONDUCT
EVIDENCE § 2:19, at 2-118 n.28 (Thompson West 2006).
174 See Park, supra note 83, at 768.
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some studies examine re-arrest rates,' 75 whereas others may
only look at convictions. 176 Another problem is the number
of offenses which go undetected. 177 As one commentator
has noted, "the true recidivism rate may be practically
unknowable."'
' 78
Even when data is available, the statistics may be
irrelevant to evaluate whether "other acts" character
evidence has any bearing on a trial for a new offense. For
instance, in order to properly use recidivism data to
demonstrate a likelihood for future misconduct, the person
would have to have an opportunity to commit additional
crimes,1 79 and the new crime would need to be similar to
the prior crime. 18 A widely reported statistic on recidivism
175 In addition to the problem that a person who is arrested for a new
crime may actually be innocent of it, using rearrest rates causes
problems in interpreting the data because the police frequently
"round[s] up the usual suspects" when a crime is committed. The arrest
of a suspect for a crime may be more likely because he was convicted
of a prior similar crime. Park, supra note 83, at 772.
176Id. at 770.
1
77 Id. at 769.
1781d. at 770.
179 It is frequently said that the recidivism rate for murder is among the
lowest of all crimes because murderers serving long prison sentences
do not have an opportunity to commit another crime. This may be
partly true, but a more accurate measure is to look at the recidivism rate
for those who have been released from prison. For murderers, this rate
is also extremely low. Of course, there may be other reasons for this,
such as the advanced age of a person released from prison following a
long prison sentence. As one commentator put it, "[i]t is not surprising
to find the recidivism rate for convicted murderers to be low, if only
because their productivity as murderers is likely to be impaired by age
by the time they are released." Id. at 771.
180 If one is examining the admissibility of prior similar acts, it only
makes sense to examine whether a prior act is likely to cause a person
to commit the same act in the future. In some jurisdictions, a traffic
offense is a criminal matter. But traffic violations are likely poor
indicators of a crime such as an assault. They might, however, be
relevant to a crime such as vehicular homicide, which contains a traffic
component.
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for sexual offenders is that it approaches 50 percent.
However, this rate is lower than almost all other types of
crimes, and the reported recidivism rate is nonspecific in
that it is the rate that the offender was rearrested for any
crime.' 81 Thus, the result does not indicate the validity of
assumptions behind Rules 413, 414, and 415, that a sexual
offender is likely to commit a future sexual offense.
Numerous authors 182 have argued that past behavior
is predictive of future behavior. One of the predictors of
criminal activity is whether the person has committed a
crime-any crime-in the past. However, the question is:
how should one define a "crime" for the purpose of
determining if it is predictive? Certainly a student who has
accumulated a hundred parking tickets during his four years
of college has demonstrated that he or she is a scofflaw, but
would a demonstrated low threshold for breaking the law
be predictive of a later charge of armed robbery? Clearly,
some discretion must be demonstrated when considering
how a past crime relates to the probability of a future crime.
Recognizing this fact, the original authors of the Federal
Rules of Evidence, who subscribed to the situational
approach, rather than the trait theory approach, excluded
this type of evidence.1
8 3
Even with the large uncertainties in the recidivism
statistics, there are some results that are probative to the
admission of evidence of similar prior acts. In a 1989
study, researchers looked at 100,000 prisoners for three
181 J. Comparet-Cassani, A Primer on the Civil Trial of a Sexually
Violent Predator, 37 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 1057, 1072 n.80 (2000).
182 See supra Section ll.d.
183 See FED. R. EvID. 404(b). The titles of Federal Rules of Evidence
413, 414, and 415 seem to require that the prior bad act be "similar,"
but the text of the rules does not require factual similarity between the
cases. In cases with significant factual similarity, the evidence allowed
by these rules would likely be admissible under the exception for
evidence of "motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge,
identity, or absence of mistake or accident." FED. R. EVID. 404(b).
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years after release and measured the re-arrest rate for the
same type of crime. From lowest to highest recidivism rate
for the same type of crime, the researchers found murderers
(2.8 percent), rapists (7.7 percent), violent robbers (19.6
percent), drug offenders (24.8 percent), and burglars (31.9
percent). 184  Thus, even with a substantial amount of
underreporting of new offenses for rapists, the statistics
"suggest precisely the opposite of what the rules assume"-
that prior sexual offenses are less useful in predicting future
similar offenses than other crimes, such as drug offenses
and burglaries.
185
Politicians and the public media have convinced the
American public that "sex offenders are a class of offenders
with unusually high rates of recidivism."' 86 However, this
assumption is unfounded and has "little empirical
substantiation."' 187 Even proponents of adopting state rules
similar to the federal rules concede that "that no conclusive
data proves that most sex offenders are exceptional
recidivists, i.e. that they are more likely to commit another
184 See David P. Leonard, The Federal Rules of Evidence and the
Political Process, 22 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 305, 339 (1995) [hereinafter
Political Process] at note 157 (citing Bryden & Park, "Other Crimes"
Evidence in Sex Offense Cases, 78 MINN. L. REV. 529 (1994)). In 1992
another study was conducted, which showed a three year re-arrest rate
for rapists of only 2.9 percent. Waller, supra note 49, at 1517. In more
recent Department of Justice statistics, the three year re-arrest rate of
sex offenders released in 1994 was 5.3 percent, 40 percent of which
committed the new crime within a year of release. In addition, the
Department of Justice study showed that, when looking at the rate of
recidivism for any crime, the recidivism rate for sexual offenders (43
percent) was lower than that of the convict rate as a whole (68 percent).
PATRICK A. LANGAN ET AL., RECIDIVISM OF SEX OFFENDERS RELEASED
FROM PRISON IN 1994 (Nov. 2003), available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/
content/pub/pdf/rsorp94.pdf. Unfortunately, it appears that the
Department of Justice discontinued the recidivism study shortly after
Rules 413, 414, and 415 were passed.
185 Political Process, supra note 184, at 339.
186 Ahluwalia, supra note 157, at 494.
187 fd-
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sex offense than a murderer is to commit another
murder."' 88  The public bias against sex offenders and
assumption that sexual offenders represent a class of
incurable deviants plays directly to the misuse of "other
acts" character evidence by jurors.
V. Impact of Federal Rules of Evidence 413, 414,
and 415
a. Burden Shifting
One of the curious aspects of Rules 413, 414, and
415 is that some of their rationalizations are actually
encompassed as exceptions in Federal Rule of Evidence
404(b). Commentators have argued that the "defendant's
desire for . . . sexual gratification is essentially akin to
proof of motive." 189 Proof of motive is an exception to the
exclusion of character evidence of Federal Rule of
Evidence 404(b). Similarly, the evidence could be
admitted to contest lack of consent, but "absence of
mistake" 190 is already included as an exception to the
rule.' 91 It is at least arguable that very little has changed by
the admission of the rules, because they only allow
evidence which was already admissible under
exceptions, 192 and the rules are unnecessary.
188 Joyce R. Lombardi, Comment, Because Sex Crimes Are Different:
Why Maryland Should (Carefully) Adopt the Contested Federal Rules
of Evidence 413 and 414 That Permit Propensity Evidence of a
Criminal Defendant's Other Sex Offenses, 34 U. BALT. L. REv. 103,
119 (2004).
189 Melilli, supra note 50, at 1585.
190 FED. R. EvID. 404(b).
'9' Melilli, supra note 50, at 1586.
192 See generally David P. Bryden & Roger C. Park, "Other Crimes"
Evidence in Sex Offense Cases, 78 MINN. L. REv. 529 (1994)
(reviewing pre Federal Rule of Evidence 413, 414, and 415 admission
of prior sex offenses under exceptions for motive, identity, plan, intent,
absence of mistake, and for impeachment).
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However, even if the rules are unnecessary for the
purpose of determining admissibility of the evidence, the
rules shift the burden to a presumption of admissibility,
because Federal Rules of Evidence declare that "other acts"
character evidence "is admissible."'93  Even with the
subsequent application of Federal Rule of Evidence 403,
the burden is now on the defense to keep the evidence out,
rather than the burden being on the prosecution (or plaintiff
in a civil trial) to convince the judge that the evidence
should be allowed in under a Rule 404(b) exception.
b. Adoption of similar rules by the states
Given the numerous reasons why "other acts"
character evidence should be excluded, one should consider
why Congress forced the rules on the judiciary. 194  For
instance, the majority of sex crimes are tried in state, rather
than federal court. 95  Because the vast majority of sex
crimes are charged in state courts, one might ask if a
change of the Federal Rules of Evidence really matters.
Because the majority of sex crimes are prosecuted
in state courts, 196 one might question if there was any real
impact of the law of evidence when Federal Rules of
Evidence 413, 414, and 415 were adopted. Arguably, these
193 FED. R. EVID. 413,414, 415 (emphasis added).
94 See supra Section III.a, notes 21-28 and accompanying text.
195 For example, in 2007, there were 428 cases brought with federal
criminal charges of sexual assaults. Judicial Business of the United
States Courts, Judicial Business 2007, Table D-4, available at
http://www.uscourts.gov/Statistics/JudicialBusiness/JudicialBusiness20
07.aspx. In the same year, there were 23,207 arrests in state courts for
charges of forcible rape. SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE
STATISTICS ONLINE, available at http://www.albany.edu/
sourcebook/.
196 Edward J. Imwinkelried, Perspectives on Proposed Federal Rules of
Evidence 413-415, 22 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 285, 288 (1995). See also
Fingar, supra note 120, at 504-05; Political Process, supra note 184, at
340; Sheft, supra note 55, at 58.
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rules impact a small minority of sexual assault cases1 97 and
thus their impact should be quite small.
However, the effect of the new rules is not solely on
the federal evidence law. When they were originally
passed in 1975,198 the Federal Rules of Evidence had a
profound impact on state evidence law. The Federal Rules
of Evidence are taught at most law schools in the country.
At the time of the passage of the Federal Rules of Evidence
413, 414, and 415, the majority of states had adopted rules
of evidence which were similar to the existing Federal
Rules of Evidence. 199 At the time of the passage of the new
rules, there had already been a movement in states to have
laws consistent, for the most part, with the federal rules,
and one might have expected that states would move to
adopt rules similar to Federal Rules of Evidence 413, 414,
and 415.2°°
In essence, the new Federal Rules 413, 414, and 415
were frontrunners in a new movement in evidence law.
20 '
197 The federal rules come into play in less than 2 percent of all sex
assault cases. See supra note 195 and accompanying text.
198 Act to Establish Rules of Evidence for Certain Courts and
Proceedings, Pub. L. No. 93-595, 88 Stat. 1926 (1975).
199 In 1995, thirty eight states had adopted rules similar to the Federal
Rules of Evidence. Political Process, supra note 184, at 340. In the
following decade, four more states adopted versions of the Federal
Rules of Evidence. 21 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & KENNETH W.
GRAHAM, JR., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, EVIDENCE § 5009
(3d ed.).
200 The actual procedure by which rules of evidence are adopted in the
states is beyond the scope of this article. In some states the rules of
evidence are codified in statutes, in others, they are judicially adopted
rules of evidence. In others, the legislature and the judiciary share the
authority. For the purposes of this article, the author has conducted a
survey of the codified statutes and rules of evidence for the states.
201 Shortly after the passage of the rules, some authors suggested this
revolution in state codes of evidence. See, e.g., Fingar, supra note 120,
at 510 ("every state in the United States should incorporate the recent
legislation into its evidence code in order to achieve increased
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Time has shown that the change in the Federal Rules had
the predicted effect on state rules. At the time of the
passage Federal Rules 413, 414, and 415, only two states
had statutes governing admissibility of "other acts"
character evidence in sex crimes. 20 2 Fifteen years later, the
list has grown to a substantial minority of states 203 with one
state with a new law soon to go into effect204 and proposed
legislation in another.
20 5
The histories of these laws and rules show that
many states were using the same justification for passing
the laws as the Federal Government. The advisory
committee for the Alaska Rules of Evidence noted that the
equivalent rule in Alaska was "adopted for the sole reason
consistency and intellectual honesty in the law regarding the
admissibility of uncharged sexual misconduct evidence").
202 IND. CODE § 35-37-4-15 (1993); Mo. REV. STAT. § 566.025 (1995).
Both of these laws have now been overturned by state courts. See infra
notes 213-16 and accompanying text.
203 The following list includes both statutes and rules of evidence, by
the date they went into effect. The laws and rules cover sexual assault
cases, but some are restricted to crimes against minors, while others are
broader in scope. California: CAL.EVID.CODE § 1108 (West)
(passed in 1995); Texas: TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. ART. §
38.37 (Vernon) (effective 1995); Colorado: COLO. REV. STAT. § 16-
10-301 (effective 1996); Arizona: ARIZ. R. EVID. 404(c)) (effective
1997); Alaska: ALASKA R. EVID. 404(b)(2)-(3) (effective 1998);
Illinois: 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/115-7.3 (effective 1998); Florida:
FLA. STAT. § 90.404 (effective 2001); Louisiana: LA. CODE EVID.
ANN. 412.2 (passed 2001); Iowa: IOWA CODE § 701.11 (passed in
2003); Michigan: MICH. COMP. LAWS. § 768.27a (effective 2006);
Tennessee: TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-17-124 (effective 2006) (admitting
evidence of prior sex crimes in cases of sex crimes against children
under the age of 13); Oklahoma: 12 OKLA. STAT. § 2413 and 2414
(passed 2007); Utah: UTAH R. EVID. 404(c) (effective 2008);
Washington: WASH. REV. CODE § 10.58.090 (effective 2008).
204 Nebraska: NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 27-413 to -415 (effective January 1,
2010).
205 Kansas: KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-455 (prior acts evidence not
admissible). But see 2009 Kan. Laws Ch. 103 (S.B. 44) (proposed
amendments to allow for admission of evidence of prior sexual crimes).
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that the legislature has mandated the amendment." 20 6 The
legislative record of the California statute admitting "other
acts" character evidence in sex offense cases2 07 justified the
statute on the basis of the comments in the congressional
record for the passage of Federal Rules of Evidence and an
article 20 8 written by the author of the Federal Rules. 20 9 The
Colorado legislature wrote its justification-based on the
notions of underreported crimes, lack of credible witness
testimony, and sexual offender recidivism-directly into
the statute. 210  The Florida legislature passed a statute
206 ALASKA R. EvID. 403 advisory committee's note.
207 CAL. EVID. CODE § 1108 (West 2008).
208 Karp, supra note 30.
209 See The Assembly Journal for the 1995-96 Regular Session, 3277.
210 COLO. REV. STAT. § 16-10-301. The text of the statute includes a
preamble outlining the reasons for the passage of the law:
The general assembly hereby finds and declares that
sexual offenses are a matter of grave statewide
concern. These frequently occurring offenses are
aggressive and assaultive violations of the well-
being, privacy, and security of the victims, are
severely contrary to common notions of proper
behavior between people, and result in serious and
long-lasting harm to individuals and society. These
offenses often are not reported or are reported long
after the offense for many reasons, including: The
frequency with which the victims are vulnerable,
such as young children who may be related to the
perpetrator; the personal indignity, humiliation, and
embarrassment involved in the offenses themselves;
and the fear of further personal indignity,
humiliation, and embarrassment in connection with
investigation and prosecution. These offenses usually
occur under circumstances in which there are no
witnesses except for the accused and the victim, and,
because of this and the frequent delays in reporting,
there is often no evidence except for the conflicting
testimony. Moreover, there is frequently a reluctance
on the part of others to believe that the offenses
occurred because of the inequality between the victim
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instituting the admission of prior acts evidence, and it was
adopted by the Florida Supreme Court over the
recommendation of the advisory committee. 211  In
Washington, where the state legislature has co-extensive
authority with the judiciary to pass rules of evidence, the
legislature adopted the exception "to ensure that juries
receive the necessary evidence to reach a just and fair
verdict."21 2 None of the authors of these rules and statutes
presented anything beyond the conclusory statements and
justifications offered in the passage of the Federal Rules.
and the perpetrator, such as between the child victim
and the adult accused, or because of the deviant and
distasteful nature of the charges. In addition, it is
recognized that some sex offenders cannot or will not
respond to treatment or otherwise resist the impulses
which motivate such conduct and that sex offenders
are extremely habituated. As a result, such offenders
often commit numerous offenses involving sexual
deviance over many years, with the same or different
victims, and often, but not necessarily, through
similar methods or by common design. The general
assembly reaffirms and reemphasizes that, in the
prosecution of sexual offenses, including in proving
the corpus delicti of such offenses, there is a greater
need and propriety for consideration by the fact
finder of evidence of other relevant acts of the
accused, including any actions, crimes, wrongs, or
transactions, whether isolated acts or ongoing actions
and whether occurring prior to or after the charged
offense. The general assembly finds that such
evidence of other sexual acts is typically relevant and
highly probative, and it is expected that normally the
probative value of such evidence will outweigh any
danger of unfair prejudice, even when incidents are
remote from one another in time.
Id.
211 In re Amendments to the Florida Evidence Code, 825 So.2d 339
(Fla. 2002).
212 2008 Wash. Legis. Serv. Ch. 90 (S.S.B. 6933) (West).
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Remarkably, in the two states that had statutes
admitting "other acts" evidence before the adoption of
Federal Rules of Evidence 413, 414, and 415, the statutes
have been overturned by the courts. In Missouri, the state
supreme court found that the law violated the state
constitution. 213 In Indiana, the statute was passed in May
1993, to go into effect the following year.2 14 The Indiana
statute was declared a nullity before it went into effect,
because it conflicted with the common law rules of
evidence.215  It is ironic that the frontrunner states have
reversed course through judicial decisions and ruled that
prior sexual misconduct evidence is not admissible.
216
c. Conviction and Plea Bargain Rates
One of the premises in support of passage of the
rules was that prosecution of sex offenders was difficult
because of lack of credible testimony of the victims or
underreporting of crimes. 217 The changes in the rules were
supposed to tip the scales toward the prosecution by
213 State v. Ellison, 239 S.W.3d 603, 607-08 (2007) (finding Mo. REV.
STAT. § 566.025 violates the state constitution). See also William E.
Marcantel, Note, Protecting the Predator or the Prey? The Missouri
Supreme Court's Refusal to Allow Past Sexual Misconduct as
Propensity Evidence, 74 Mo. L. REv. 211, 229 (2009).
214 1993 Ind. Legis. Serv. P.L. 232-1993 (H.E.A. 1342) (West).
215 Brim v. State, 624 N.E.2d 27, 33 n.2 (Ind. Ct. App. 1993). This case
was decided on November 23, 1993. The statement by the Brim court
was dicta, but was later reinforced in Day v. State, 643 N.E. 2d I (Ind.
Ct. App. 1994). The statement by the Day court is also dicta, because
the crime in that case happened before the law went into effect, but the
statements in the two cases suggest that the courts will not permit
admission of "other acts" character evidence based on the statute.
216 The legislative mandate for the rules of evidence may violate at
least one other state constitution. The Tennessee Supreme Court has
ruled in another context that the judiciary is not bound by rules of
procedure adopted by the legislature. See State v. Mallard, 40 S.W.3d
473 (2001).
217 See supra Section Ill.b.
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shifting the burden to the defense to keep evidence out.
This burden shifting was a sea change in the evidence
landscape surrounding trials of sexual offenders.
The trial landscape for sexual misconduct could
change in a number of ways. For instance, one might
expect that with the evidence being presumptively
admissible, defendants might seek a plea bargain rather
than the risk of a trial. Defendants might prefer a bench
trial rather than a jury trial, because the judge would,
presumably, be willing to give character evidence less
weight. Defendants might try to take the stand in their own
defense. Whereas a defendant may previously have
refrained from taking the stand under the old rules because
the evidence may have been admissible for impeachment
evidence if they claimed "mistake," 218 under the new rules,
with a flood of "other acts" character evidence coming in, a
defendant may be left with no choice but to testify on his
own behalf to try to "remove the sting."
219
It is difficult to assess whether all of these results
have come to pass. However, from the statistical
220evidence, it appears that at least some of these outcomes
have occurred. Both the total number of federal sexual
assault charges and the conviction rate for federal sexual
assault cases have gone up substantially in the past thirty
years. Figure 1 shows that the number of federal sex
assault cases has gone from fewer than 100 in 1980 to over
218 See FED. R. EVID. 404(b).
219 Ohler v. United States, 529 U.S. 753, 758 (2000).
220 Statistical evidence in this section from 1980-1996 is found in The
Reports of the Judicial Conference. Data from 1997-2008 is found in
the Judicial Business of the United States Courts, Annual Report of the
Director, 1997-2008, available at
http://www.uscourts.gov/Statistics/JudicialBusiness.aspx.
221 Here, we only investigate the change in conviction rates and plea
bargain rates. Because of the low number of trials and the even smaller
number of bench trials, the small sample size makes statistical analysis
for other outcomes difficult.
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400 in the last three decades. Examination of the statistics
shows that the defendants in the overwhelming majority of
these cases plead guilty, and most of the increase in cases
resulted in guilty pleas.
The conviction rate for federal sexual assault cases
has risen dramatically over the last thirty years. In an
eleven year period from 1980-1990, before the sexual
offender rules were passed, the average conviction rate of
sexual assaults in federal court was about 72 percent. 222 In
the most recent eleven-year period, from 1998-2008, after
the rules were passed, the conviction rate was 87 percent.
The change in conviction rates for sexual assaults may not
entirely be a result of the new rules of evidence during that
period, as the conviction rate for all crimes in federal court
also rose from about 81 percent to 90 percent.
222 This number is calculated by dividing the total number of pleas,
nolo contendre, and convictions by the total number of sexual assault
cases filed. In order to examine the effect of Rules 413 and 414, the
cases have been limited to sexual assault cases which would qualify
under those rules. Cases for other sex crimes, such as sex trafficking
and distribution, sex offender registry violations, and sexually explicit
material have not been included. Naturally, the statistics for the total
number of cases filed does not include cases where accusations were
made but no charge was brought against the defendant.
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500
450 a Guilty at Trial
400 0 Plead Guilty/No
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Figure 1.
Total Federal Sexual Assault Cases by Disposition. 223
The data for conviction rates appear in Figure 2, and
it is immediately apparent that in the 1980s the conviction
rate for sexual assaults was lower than the overall
conviction rate for federal crimes. After the turn of the
century, the conviction rate for sexual assaults was nearly
the same as the conviction rate for federal crimes. In 1995,
223 Statistics for guilty pleas includes no contest pleas, because statistics
for no contest and guilty pleas are not available for all years. However,
the total number of nolo contendre pleas for sex abuse cases is
generally quite small. Between 2001 and 2004, there were a total of
1370 cases where the defendant was found guilty. Of this total number,
only two were nolo contendre pleas, or less than 0.2 percent of the
total.
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the year in which the new rules went into effect, the rate of
convictions for sexual assaults was actually higher than the
rate for conviction on all federal crimes. This statistic
immediately calls into question one of the premises behind
Federal Rules of Evidence 413, 414, and 415-that
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Figure 2. Conviction Rates of Federal Sexual Offenders.
The vertical lines represent the passage of the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines (1984), the introduction of DNA
evidence in federal courts (1992), and the passage of
Federal Rules of Evidence 413, 414, and 415 (1995).
The implementation of the rules in 1995 may not be
the cause of the change in conviction rates. The greatest
change in the rate occurred between 1980 and 1990, with a
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slower trend afterwards. As a result, it is apparent that the
rule changes were not effective in delivering the promised
result: the changes in the rules were likely not responsible
for any substantive increase in conviction rates.
A similar effect appears in the rate of plea bargains.
In the 1980s, approximately 54 percent of federal sexual
assault charges resulted in either a guilty plea or reached a
conviction nolo contendre. In the most recent eleven-year
period, the rate jumped to 79 percent. Figure 3 shows that
the rate of plea deals in sexual assault cases rose by
approximately 30 percent between 1980 and 2009, with the
highest year being 1995, the year that the new rules went
into effect. However, the majority of the rise does not
appear to be a result of rule changes in 1995, but rather
other effects in the 1980s. After the change in rules, the
rate of pleas in sexual assault cases is approximately the
same. Again, the proponents of the rule changes used the
premise of difficulty in obtaining convictions to effect their
passage, but the data shows that, at the time the rules were
passed, a greater proportion of sexual assault defendants
plead guilty than defendants in other federal crimes, and
after the rules were passed the plea rate did not increase
significantly for sexual assault cases.
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Figure 3. Plea Rates (including nolo contendre) of Federal
Sexual Offenders. The vertical lines represent the passage
of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines (1984), the
introduction of DNA evidence in federal courts (1992), and
the passage of Federal Rules of Evidence 413, 414, and 415
(1995).
The large increase in conviction rates and rates of
plea bargains is likely due to factors other than the change
in the rules of evidence in 1995. The changes could result
from other factors, such as exercise of prosecutorial
discretion to only bring the strongest cases (which would
decrease the number of charges brought), introduction of
the federal sentencing guidelines, which created an
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incentive for defendants to plead charges down in 1984,224
or improved forensic techniques. For example, in the early
1990s, DNA evidence was first allowed in federal court.
225
Since that time DNA evidence has become a valuable tool
for prosecutions. DNA evidence is particularly useful in
prosecutions of sex offenders, as DNA evidence left on the
victim would be nearly conclusive and results in a very
high conviction rate. 226  The largest jump in the plea
bargain rate was shortly after the introduction of DNA
evidence in federal courts.
The promise that the addition of the rules would
change the landscape of federal sexual assault trials by
increasing conviction rates remains unfulfilled. The
statistics do not support that the new rules actually
dramatically increased conviction rates or plea bargain
rates over a trend that was already occurring for federal
crimes as a whole. While the conviction rate for sexual
assaults has gone up faster than the general conviction rate
for federal crimes, most of the disparity was made up
224 See The Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 (Chapter II of the
Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984), Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98
Stat. 1837 (creating the United States Sentencing Commission). The
Sentencing Reform Act made all federal sentences determinate. See
also PROTECT Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-21, 117 Stat. 650
(restricting grounds where a federal judge could make a downward
departure from sentencing guidelines in sex abuse cases). But see
United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005) (finding mandatory
federal sentencing guidelines violates the Sixth Amendment of the
Constitution).
225 See United States v. Jakobetz, 747 F. Supp. 250 (D. Vt. 1990)
(finding DNA evidence admissible under the Frye v. United States, 293
F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923)).
226 Such evidence is unlikely to be used in many other crimes where
physical forensic evidence is unnecessary. DNA evidence would not
be in issue in cases where the defendant claimed consent of the victim.
However, reliable data on the "consent" defense is not widely
available.
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before the rules went into effect, and the change is likely a
result of numerous other factors.
VI. Conclusion
In 1994, when Congress passed legislation
implementing Federal Rules of Evidence 413, 414, and
415, they put in place a process to erode the character
evidence exclusionary rule that had developed over two
centuries of common law in the United States. The stated
intent was to make it easier to convict sex offenders, and
the unstated intent was to influence the development of
evidence law in the several states. These objectives have
been accomplished with mixed results.
The statistical evidence shows that the conviction
rates for sex offenders have changed little since the change
in the rules of evidence went into effect. While conviction
rates for sex offenses have increased over the last three
decades, the majority of the increase paralleled increases in
the overall federal conviction rate. Additionally, the
majority of increase occurred before the changes in the
rules of evidence and was likely a result of other factors.
The second intent, although not express, was to
influence the laws of the states. While the Federal System
sets up two distinct legal systems, one in the federal
government and one in the several states, there is a
significant amount of "cross pollination" between the two
systems. Many states have adopted rules of evidence that
are either based on the Federal Rules of Evidence or are
strongly influenced by them.227  While it was never
explicitly stated as a goal for the passage of the Federal
Rules of Evidence 413, 414, and 415, scholars predicted the
227 Forty-two of the fifty states now have rules of evidence that parallel
the Federal Rules of Evidence. 21 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT &
KENNETH W. GRAHAM, JR., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE,
EVIDENCE § 5009 (2d ed. 2005).
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trend toward similarity in state and federal evidence laws
the laws would continue. 228 Despite the controversy when
Congress originally passed the rules, this second goal has
also been largely successful.
229
With the success of at least some of these goals, it is
also an appropriate time to assess the cost of the changes.
Federal Rules of Evidence 413, 414, and 415 have come at
a significant cost to fairness to criminal defendants. The
rules are designed to admit evidence that will appeal to the
basest emotions of jurors in a way that begs jurors to
misuse it. The rules admit "other acts" character evidence,
which is statistically less relevant than character evidence
in many other crimes. In their rush to punish sexual
offenders, Congress pushed to admit evidence that was the
least probative and the most prejudicial, in contrast to the
fundamental protections of Federal Rule of Evidence
403. 230 Essentially, Rules 413, 414, and 415 are designed
to take advantage of juror prejudice and to include evidence
that is of questionable probative value. Congress tipped the
scales in favor of conviction.
Federal Rules of Evidence 413, 414, and 415 are
also a cumbersome addition to the rules. The rules have
started to make the 400 series of Federal Rules of Evidence
look like the 800 series of Federal Rules for hearsay
evidence. 231 The hearsay rule states that hearsay statements
228 See, e.g., Fingar, supra note 120, at 510 ("every state in the United
States should incorporate the recent legislation into its evidence code in
order to achieve increased consistency and intellectual honesty in the
law regarding the admissibility of sexual misconduct evidence").
229 The list of states which have adopted similar rules are listed supra
notes 202-205. The number is now a substantial minority of states,
but in two of these states the courts have ruled the laws either
unconstitutional (Missouri) or a nullity (Indiana).
230 In a survey of 60,000 adults, the Department of Justice found that
following homicide, rape and child abuse were considered the next two
most serious crimes. Aluise, supra note 82, at 190-91.
231 With special admissibility or exceptions to character evidence
provided by Federal Rules of Evidence 406-415, there are now ten
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are not admissible.232 After declaring that hearsay is not
admissible, the next two rules carve out nearly three dozen
exceptions where the evidence is deemed to be sufficiently
reliable to be admitted. 33 When exceptions are combined
with case law defining the constitutional overlay of the
rules,2 3 4 what remains is a complex series of rules. 235 The
addition of new rules for different kinds of "other acts"
character evidence, that is deemed reliable,23 6 could give
the character evidence rules the same complexity of the
hearsay rules-with the possible complication that this type
of evidence is likely to be more prejudicial to the jury than
all but the most damning hearsay evidence.
Justice Brandeis once described the Federal System
as one where "a single courageous state may, if its citizens
choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social .
rules that provide overlays on top of the basic rule of character
evidence admission, Federal Rule of Evidence 404.
232 FED. R. EVID. 802.
233 FED. R. EVID. 803, 804.
234 See, e.g., Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 61 (2004) (finding
admission of most hearsay evidence without production of the declarant
violates the Confrontation Clause). See also Robert P. Mosteller,
Crawford's Impact on Hearsay Statements in Domestic Violence and
Child Sexual Abuse Cases, in DUKE LAW SCHOOL FACULTY
SCHOLARSHIP SERIES, 127 (Mar. 2008), available at
http://lsr.nellco.org/dukefs/127.
235 The complexity of the hearsay rules has been debated for decades.
See, e.g., G. Michael Fenner, Law Professor Reveals Shocking Truth
About Hearsay, 62 UMKC L. REV. 1, 100 (1992) ("[Tlhe hearsay rule
is, in fact, overly cumbersome, unnecessarily difficult, roundly
misunderstood and misapplied, gingerly avoided as the most feared of
all of the rules of evidence, and not worth the trees that die in its
defense and its explanation."). Christopher B. Mueller, Post-Modern
Hearsay Reform: The Importance of Complexity, 76 MINN. L. REV.
367, 376 (1992) (noting "no one who studies or teaches evidence
doubts that the hearsay doctrine is hard to apply and administer" and
calling for hearsay reform).
236 As noted above, supra Section IV, the "reliability" of other acts
character evidence is certainly questionable.
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experiments without risk to the rest of the country." 237 This
happened in the case of evidence of prior bad acts evidence
in sexual assault cases, when Indiana and Missouri passed
statutes which admitted character evidence in sexual
offense cases.23 8 Perhaps Congress, acting with political
motives, was too quick to act when it responded by passing
legislation which instituted Rules 413, 414, and 415.
The addition of Rules 413, 414, and 415 to the
Federal Rules of Evidence was an experiment that
succeeded in its goals of stigmatizing a despised group and
influencing changes in laws of the several states. However,
the success of the experiment came at a tremendous cost to
the principles of fairness in admission of evidence that
dates back to the middle of the nineteenth century. Federal
Rules of Evidence 413, 414, and 415 deliberately play to
the passions of the jury and deliberately put evidence in
front of a jury that has prejudicial value that exceeds its
probative value. Fifteen years after the experiment began,
it is time for others to follow the lead of courts in Missouri
and Indiana 39-the two states that began the experiment.
The time has come to restore the Federal Rules of Evidence
to their form before the addition of the special "other acts"
character evidence rules for alleged sexual offenders.
237 New State Ice Co. v. Liebman, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis
J., dissenting).
238 IND. CODE § 35-37-4-15 (1993); Mo. REV. STAT § 566.025 (1995).
239 State v. Ellison, 239 S.W.3d 603 (2007) (finding MO. REV. STAT §
566.025, which admitted sexual misconduct evidence, violates the state
constitution); Brim v. State, 624 N.E.2d 27, 33 n.2 (Ind. Ct. App. 1993)
(declaring the Indiana law admitting other acts character evidence a
nullity).
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